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ABSTRACT
Many argue that the American educational system is under siege. 
Students bring with them to school an array of social problems never before 
seen in this country. Illegal drugs, raging violence, brutal crime, abject poverty, 
and hopeless desolation pervade our children’s lives. Loaded firearms, deadly 
weapons, and lethal substances are confiscated daily in urban, suburban, and 
rural schools. Administrators are shot, teachers are mugged, students are 
stabbed. Schools are in crisis; the war rages. How do school administrators 
cope?
This investigation concerns the interrelationships, definitions, and 
applications of several phenomena; war, education, administration, leadership, 
and power. Through the experiences of the researcher as a fighter-bomber 
pilot with the 22nd Bomb Squadron,1 the Flying Tigers, during World War II 
and as an educator for nearly fifty years, comparisons between these two 
principle environments will be made in light of the phenomena under study.
The present study, then, is an historical case study of the development of 
the Flying Tigers in relation to educational administration and leadership in the
1 In text, the 22nd Bomb Squadron and The Flying Tigers will be used 
somewhat interchangeably.
iii
current school environment. Historical research was used for detail concerning 
the development of the squadron and its experiences during World War II. 
Literature on situational leadership in and outside education was examined in 
relationship to the experiences of the researcher as a fighter-bomber pilot 
during the war and as an educator for fifty years.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION 
Many argue that the American educational system is under siege. 
Students bring with them to school an array of social problems never before 
seen in this country. Illegal drugs, raging violence, brutal crime, abject poverty, 
and hopeless desolation pervade our children’s lives. Loaded firearms, deadly 
weapons, and lethal substances are confiscated daily in urban, suburban, and 
rural schools. Administrators are shot, teachers are mugged, students are 
stabbed. Schools are in crisis; the war rages. How do school administrators 
cope?
This investigation concerns the interrelationships, definitions, and 
applications of several phenomena: war, education, administration, leadership, 
and power. Through the experiences of the researcher as a fighter-bomber 
pilot with the 22nd Bomb Squadron,1 the Flying Tigers, during World War II 
and as an educator for nearly fifty years, comparisons between these two 
principle environments will be made in light of the phenomena under study.
1 In text, the 22nd Bomb Squadron and The Flying Tigers will be used 
somewhat interchangeably.
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Background
Public education in the United States predates the establishment of this
country. As early as 1685,2 laws were proposed requiring towns to provide
schools, political leaders to select teachers, and children to attend school for at
least seven years. Both boys and girls were included, although educated
separately, and children of the Indians [sic] and of the poor were invited to
attend as well. Curriculum was practical and involved reading, writing, and
arithmetic for all children as well as manual trades for boys and domestic
training for girls.
Over time, United States public schools have become a model for
educating the masses for living in a democracy. The American system is based
on the presumption that an enlightened citizenry is a requirement of a free,
truly representative society.3
The cultivation of free men for a free society was an ethic that took into 
account both the humanistic belief in the inalienable right of man to 
liberty and the pursuit of happiness, and the instrumental use of 
education to provide for the intelligent and responsible leadership that 
was necessary to ensure such a free society.4
2 John Hardin Best and Robert T. Sidwell, eds., The American Legacy of 
Learning: Readings in the History of Education (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott 
Company, 1967), 56.
3 Paul Leicester Ford, ed., The Works of Thomas Jefferson (New York: 
G. P. Putnam, 1904), 60-65.
4 Best and Sidwell, 90.
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The United States educational system, therefore, in some sense was established
to create leadership for our countiy. Throughout American histoiy this fact has
been demonstrated both politically and militarily.
The stability of schools as an institution has reinforced its role as an
instrument of social change. As a public system, it is capable of far-reaching
change unlike any other establishment or resource in this country.
Like all simple and unsophisticated peoples we Americans have a 
sublime faith in education. Faced with any difficult problem of life we 
set our minds at rest sooner or later by the appeal to the school. We 
are convinced that education is the one unfailing remedy for every ill to 
which man is subject, whether it be vice, crime, war, poverty, riches, 
injustice, racketeering, political corruption, race hatred, class conflict, or 
just plain original sin. We even speak glibly and often about the general 
reconstruction of society through the school. We cling to this faith in 
spite of the fact that the veiy period in which our troubles have 
multiplied so rapidly has witnessed an unprecedented expansion of 
organized education. This would seem to suggest that our schools, 
instead of directing the course of change, are themselves driven by the 
very forces that are transforming the rest of the social order.5
Within the past decade, however, in addition to curing the ills of society
bevond the walls of the school, the school is expected to solve the world’s
problems since they have now arrived in the school.
5 George S. Counts, Dare the School Build a New Social Order? (New 
York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1932), 3-4.
The Problem
A comparison can be made between war, defined as an . .  armed
conflict between nations, tribes or other groups . . .  a concerted effort to put
down, reduce or exterminate . . .  a state of hostility without resort to arms,"6
and the current environment of public education. Even educators see
themselves as warriors. For example, in reporting about Ruben Perez, an
Assistant Principal in Denver who was publicly berated for suspending a slew
of children from Horace Mann Middle School for chronic disruptive behavior,
journalist David Hill noted,
As I left his office, I realized that Ruben Perez sees himself as a man 
fighting a war of his own-not just a war against disruptive students but 
also a war against the bureaucrats who won’t let him do his job the way 
he sees fit. And just like Patton, he has no intention of giving in to his 
critics.7
As education-bashers will clearly state, war extends into the school districts 
between children and parents, children and teachers, parents and teachers, 
parents and administrators, parents and school boards, teachers and 
administrators, administrators and school boards, and so on.
During World War II, this researcher, who later became an educator, 
was a fighter-bomber pilot as a member of the Flying Tigers. Drawing on
6 The New Lexicon Webster’s Encyclopedic Dictionary of the English 
Language. Deluxe Edition (New York: Lexicon Publications, Inc., 1989), 1109.
7 David Hill, "The Disciplinarian," Education Week. 29 March 1995, 24.
observations and historical investigation, the following research questions were 
posed:
1. How did the Flying Tigers come to be?
2. What was the importance of the Flying Tigers to the success of the 
United States in World War II?
3. What was the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying 
Tigers'1
a. Was the mode appropriate for the military?
b. Was the mode appropriate for the time?
4. How does wartime combat compare to the educational 
environment today?
5. How does the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying 
Tigers apply to today’s educational scene?
These questions will be answered primarily through examining the history of 
the establishment and the action of the Flying Tigers and then comparing that 
information with current educational administrative and leadership practice as 
evidenced both by the literature and by the experience of the researcher.
CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY 
During World War II, this researcher, who later became an educator, 
was a fighter-bomber pilot as a member of the Flying Tigers. Drawing on 
observations and historical investigation, the following research questions were 
posed:
1. How did the Flying Tigers come to be?
2. What was the importance of the Flying Tigers to the success of the 
United States in World War II?
3. What was the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers1
a. Was the mode appropriate for the military?
b. Was the mode appropriate for the time?
4. How does wartime combat compare to the educational 
environment today?
5. How does the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying
Tigers apply to today’s educational scene?
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The Nature of the Historical Problem 
Time is running out for recounting their history for those who served in 
the military during World War II between 1941 - 1945. They are significant 
primary living resources who can assist in validating the concepts of leadership, 
organization, and administration that are addressed in this study. The research 
questions posed here are verifiable by those who were a part of the 22nd Bomb 
Squadron, the Flying Tigers, and, for the most part, many participants are still 
able to remember their experiences even to the minutest detail. Many were 
contacted and eagerly shared their experiences.
The history of the 22nd Bomb Squadron unfortunately remains 
unwritten. Documentation is critical, however, for those who lived through 
both the happy times and the horror. In some cases, combat crews witnessed 
anti-aircraft, machine gun, and enemy aircraft fire, or they flew through the 
jaws o f hell. Silenced for fifty years by memories of the atrocities of war, 
survivors now feel compelled to recount their experiences as their mortality 
faces them in the mirror each day.
As important as this history is for the participants of the Flying Tigers, it 
is also crucial for their families and all those who loved them. They, too, paid 
the supreme sacrifice donating the lives of those they loved to the cause of 
freedom. They know that their young men, in many cases, fell to the ground in 
balls of flames and their remains are now a part of the dust of China, India, or 
Burma. Equally critical, almost every member of the 22nd Bomb Squadron
8
had a roommate, friend, or acquaintance who was killed either in combat or by 
accident while serving in the squadron. This story honors love, friendship, and 
memories.
For purposes of research, the story of the Flying Tigers needs to be told 
in another perspective. By analyzing the administration, leadership, and 
organization of the 22nd Bomb Squadron in relationship to the current war on 
the educational battlefield, situational leadership can be examined. Some 
lessons that were learned may be useful in buttressing the principles and the 
qualities of these three phenomena. The situational leadership styles used 
need to be noted, scrutinized, evaluated, analyzed, and carefully recorded in 
order to apply these qualities in future leadership training. The same careful 
consideration needs to be done with the organizational concepts and the skills, 
techniques, and practices of administration.
The Nature of the Leadership Problem 
All members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron displayed loyalty to the 
United States in several ways. First, they willingly accepted the call to arms in 
World War II. Second, they obeyed without question orders that sent them 
15,000 miles from their homes and families. Every member of the 22nd Bomb 
Squadron also demonstrated leadership in a variety of ways. Therefore, both 
the leadership and administrative practices of the Flying Tigers during World 
War II have been described as well as both the ideal and catastrophic
administration. In addition, organizational structure has been explained and 
depicted.
Definitions
The definitions have been divided into four subsections: leadership, 
organization, administration, and acronyms.
Leadership
Leadership can be defined as the position or functions of a leader who 
has the ability and talent to lead by giving guidance and direction to groups 
such as an army or movement or political association. It includes the direction, 
supervision, or management of a group or an organization. Further, leadership 
is "the process of influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts 
toward goal achievement in a given situation."1 [Emphasis added.]
Leaders are ubiquitous. They may be emergent--that is, informally 
acknowledged, elected by the group, or appointed by the organization of which 
the group is a part, as is the case in the military. A leader, by definition, may 
thus be a gas station manager, a chief executive officer (CEO) of a 
multinational company, or a person who happens to be the most influential in a 
group.
1 Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational 
Behavior. Sixth Edition. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1993), 94.
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Most of the original leaders of the Flying Tigers could be considered 
emergent because they were selected on the basis of prior achievement. 
Emergent leaders are usually identified by asking such questions as "Whose 
opinion do you value most in this group?" or "Whom would you most like to 
have as your leader?" In addition, they tend to be slightly more intelligent, 
somewhat larger, and more visible and socially adept than other group 
members. The group members perceive that the emergent leader is able to 
provide the needed skills and/or economic or political resources to help the 
group achieve its goals.
Leadership, for the purposes of this study, included policies that were 
formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS), the Fourteenth Air Force, 
69th Composite Wing, 341st Bomb Group, and 22nd Bomb Squadron, with the 
authority to establish rules and regulations. The Combined Chiefs o f S taff 
established the overall direction and objective for World War II after Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill, along with his military chiefs of staff committee 
and supported by both the British Joint Plans Committee and Joint Intelligence 
Committee, consulted with President Franklin Roosevelt on the combined 
grand strategy. President Roosevelt then appointed the U.S. Joint Chiefs of 
Staff Committee that included General Henry "Hap" Arnold, Army Air Forces 
(AAF) chief, on the initiative of General George Marshall.2
2 Haywood S. Hansel Jr., The Strategic Air War Against Germany and 
Japan: A Memoir (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF,
11
Leadership policy was determined by the Air War Plans Division under 
the president’s directive. The Air War Plans Division (AWPD/1) was a newly 
created agency within the Air Staff on 11 September 1941. The leadership 
policy document clearly explained the leadership direction of air power and 
strategies that would be followed in any future conflicts using tactical and 
strategic weapons and their uses to defeat the enemy. The AWPD/1 policy 
statement, the primary leadership policy document, called for 10 groups of 
medium bombers specifically composed of B-25 and B-26 models and explained 
how they would be used.3 (See Appendix A, Photocopies of Airplanes in 
Combat)
One could argue that almost everyone is a leader of at least some 
groups and a follower in innumerable others. Personality is not enough, 
however, and recent studies support the notion of training as necessary for 
grooming leaders as the military has always done. A particular trait would not 
necessarily identify a leader.4
Organization
An organization is a rational, legitimate, and ideally dynamic relationship 
of people, coordinated formally through specialization, authority, hierarchy,
1986), 44-45.
3 Thomas H. Greer, The Development of Air Doctrine in the Armv Air 
Arm 1917-1941 (Washington, D.C.: Office of Air Force History, USAF, 1985), 
124-126.
4 Rom Harre and Roger Lamb, The Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Psychology (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), 428.
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division of labor, communication, and standard procedures toward the 
accomplishment of certain goals, objectives, or some common, mutually agreed 
upon purposes. Organizations constitute a particular kind of social system 
which has certain formal characteristics. Formal organizations exhibit:
• Specific goal orientation
• Division of work into subtasks and assignment as official duties to 
established positions in the organization
• Hierarchical arrangement of positions and clearly established 
authority relationships
• General and impersonal rules which govern, to a large extent, what 
people do in their official capacity and which guide interpersonal 
interactions among people in the organization
Organizational behavior is more precise than a related term, human relations.
While human relations suggests "the interactions between people in all kinds of
situations in which they seek, through mutual action, to achieve some purpose,"
organizational behavior refers to "a discipline that seeks to describe, understand,
and predict human behavior in the environment of formal organizations."6
An organizational chart is a simplified graphic presentation of the formal
interrelationships of the various structural and functional units of an
organization in terms of their
5 Robert G. Owens, Organizational Behavior in Education. Second 
Edition (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1981), 25.
6 Ibid., 23.
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• channels of formal communication
• purposes and objectives
• lines or levels of formal authority, control, and coordination
• tasks, processes, activities, and their location.7
Administration
Administration refers to the sum of all the ideas, techniques, procedures, 
and processes which are employed to help an organization maintain, 
coordinate, and control formally and informally organized human and material 
resources for achieving its predetermined goals. The administrative code under 
which an organization operates is a complete set of administrative rules and 
regulations, while administrative control is the continuous job of evaluating, 
planning, organizing, regulating, restraining, analyzing, verifying, and 
synchronizing the activities of the organization.
Every organization requires management. Administrative decision­
making refers to any act of decision-making concerned with the establishment, 
maintenance, revision, or abandonment of goals, objectives, policies, and other 
related actions of an organization as made by the head, heads, or other 
members of top management. An administrative officer is a high-level staff
7 Ivan S. Banki, Dictionary of Administration and Management (Los 
Angeles: Systems Research Institute, 1981), 428.
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officer who may be in charge of personnel, training, budgeting, or other related 
administrative functions.
The overall administrative structure, usually consisting of line, staff, and 
auxiliary agencies or departments through which the management and control 
of personnel and operations are accomplished, is called the administrative 
organization. In order to administer the organization effectively, administrative 
planning is necessary. This is a systematic process of looking and thinking 
ahead to recognize and define future trends, to see the relationships between 
these trends and organizational objectives, and to take the necessary actions to 
adjust to these in terms of the general framework and objectives of the 
organization, with the feasible, efficient, and economic use of personnel, 
money, methods, and other resources.
Every organization, in order to operate effectively, needs defined 
policies and procedures. Administrative policy is a statement of a rule, decision, 
or judgement which, by defining and outlining the objectives and goals of an 
organization, can guide and regulate organizational policies and methods. 
Similarly, administrative procedures are the fundamental procedures and 
methods by which an organization or agency can coordinate or regulate its own 
actions.8
8 Ibid., 105-108.
Acronyms
Words formed from the initial letters or groups of letters of the words in 
a name or phrase are called acronyms. Examples include WAC, Women’s 
Army Corps, or LORAN  from long range navigation.9 The military is famous 
for using acronyms in describing almost any name.
Literature on Leadership
Management became a science with the publication of Taylor’s Pig Iron 
studies in 1911. Like educational theory, management concepts renew and 
recycle over time. According to Hersey and Blanchard, between 1911 and 
1991, twenty-eight major theories of management, noted as milestones in the 
development of motivation and leadership, were put forward.10
Leadership research has focused on men primarily in business situations. 
Warren Bennis, for example, identified four common traits shared by all ninety 
leaders he studied:
• Management of attention--The ability to communicate a sense of 
outcome, goal, or direction that attracts followers.
Management of meaning~The ability to create and communicate 
meaning with clarity and understanding.
Management of trust—The ability to be reliable and consistent so 
people can count on them.
9 Webster’s College Dictionary. 4th ed. (New York: Random House, 
1991), 13.
10 Hersey and Blanchard, 95.
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• Management of self-The ability to know one’s self and to use one’s 
skills within limits of strengths and weaknesses.11
McCall and Lombardo, in their study of leaders who should have made it to
the top, found the following fatal flaws:
• Insensitive to others: abrasive, intimidating, bullying style
• Cold, aloof, arrogant
• Betrayal of trust
• Overly ambitious: thinking of next job, playing politics
• Specific performance problems with the business
• Overmanaging-unable to delegate or build a team
• Unable to staff effectively
• Unable to think strategically
• Unable to adapt to boss with different style
• Overdependent on advocate or mentor.12
Personality traits among leaders may or may not be the most important 
attribute of leadership; situation may be.
The following four assumptions are generally used to describe and 
understand leadership:
• Leadership is describable in terms of styles of behavior that leaders 
use in relating to groups.
• A key issue is the extent to which leader behavior should be 
directive (authoritarian), on the one hand, or participative 
(democratic), on the other hand.
• There is no one universal, best way to exercise leadership under all 
conditions; it is necessary, therefore, to use some system for assessing 
the situational contingencies in selecting a style of leader behavior.
11 Ibid., 98.
12 Ibid., 99.
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• In choosing a leadership style (for example, to be directive or 
participative), the appropriate criterion is effectiveness (for example, 
which style produces the greatest organizational effectiveness?).13
Hersey and Blanchard proposed the relative concept of situational 
leadership. Maturity, they believe, is defined as "the capacity to set high but 
attainable goals, the willingness and ability to take responsibility, and the 
experience of an individual or group,"14 Further, the maturity of both 
individuals and the work group determines the appropriate supervisory or 
leader behavior. Situational leadership applies directly to both military and 
educational environments because it relates both the leader and the group.
Related to the situational leadership model is the contingency leadership 
model. Developed by Fred Fiedler, this model suggests that leaders perform 
best in situations which are favorable to them. Favorableness to the leader may 
be related to these factors:
• The quality of relations between leader and followers
• The degree to which the task is well structured
• The power of the leader’s position15
13 Owens, 157-158.
14 Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Blanchard, Management of Organizational 
Behavior: Utilizing Human Resources (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 
1965), 161.
15 Owens, 162.
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In other words, the leadership style must be appropriate to the situation. 
Therefore, leaders need to be trained with the intent of:
• increasing the skills required for engaging in the behaviors required 
for diagnosing the situational contingencies
increasing the skills required for engaging in the behaviors required 
to implement a range of leadership styles
• understanding one’s own behavior and acquire and experiment with 
new behaviors16
The three areas of skills required for effective leadership in given situations are 
situation sensitivity, situational management, and style flexibility.17
Methodology
The design of this study was historical, observational, and retrospective. 
The researcher, as a member of the Flying Tigers, had the advantage of contact 
with key participants and primary document sources involved in the period 
under study. In addition, as an educator with nearly 50 years of experience 
combined with the review of the literature on administration, leadership, and 
organization, he was able to draw comparisons between both his personal and 
documented history as one of the Flying Tigers and his current experience as a 
classroom educator.
16 Owens, 180.
17 Ibid.
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To the extent possible, quantitative data profiles were collected on the 
surviving members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron. Leadership and 
administrative skills were noted where appropriate, and background 
information was reported as known. Primary documents were examined 
through the historical archives of the Air Force Historical Research Agency 
(HRC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama, and secondary resources were also 
reviewed.
Historical research is a complex process; therefore, applicable research 
procedures were carefully incorporated in order to establish an effective design. 
For example, external and internal criticism procedures were used to insure 
proper documentation with both an internal and an external, or third-party, 
evaluator. Consequently, both internal and external validity are built into the 
evaluation design.18
Another compensatory safeguard employed to guard against the pitfalls 
and problems with oral historical reports was triangulation cross-checks. 
Triangulation methodology involves the use of several different methods to 
study the same object. A form of replication, triangulation cross-checks can be 
achieved by collecting the same data from different samples, at different times,
18 Walter R. Borg and Meredith Damien Gall, Educational Research 
(White Plains, N.Y.: Longman, 1989), 750-752.
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and in different places. This activity increases confidence in the validity of the 
research regardless of the type of analysis used.19
Observational Research 
Observational research is used primarily for investigating human 
behavior. In the context of this study, observation was, in the strictest sense, 
retrospective because the issues now under investigation were not recorded at 
the time. The advantage to this ex post facto approach, however, is that the 
presence of the observer, the researcher, had no impact on the behavior of the 
participants. Further, observer bias is diminished because of the initial lack of 
attention to the topic, but high interest to the activities of the Flying Tigers 
during the events themselves.
One subset of observational research, however, is the case study.
Involving the detailed study of a single subject or phenomenon, the case study 
can be used ". . . as an example of a class of events or a group of 
individuals."20 Relying primarily on interviews and documents, historical case 
studies of organizations can provide insight into issues of organizational 
development, leadership, and administration. The present study, then, is a 
historical case study of the development of the Flying Tigers in relation to 
educational administration and leadership in the current school environment.
19 Ibid., 393.
20 Ibid., 488.
CHAPTER 3
THE HISTORY OF THE FLYING TIGERS 
During World War II, this researcher, who later became an educator, 
was a fighter-bomber pilot as a member of the Flying Tigers. Drawing on 
observations and historical investigation, the following research questions were 
posed:
1. How did the Flying Tigers come to be?
2. What was the importance of the Flying Tigers to the success of the 
United States in World War II?
3. What was the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying 
Tigers?
a. Was the mode appropriate for the military?
b. Was the mode appropriate for the time?
4. How does wartime combat compare to the educational environment 
today?
5. How does the administrative and leadership mode of the Flying Tigers 
apply to today’s educational scene?
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Introduction
How did the Flying Tigers come to be? The history reported here 
concerns the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers, who were part of the 
World War II action between 1942 and 1945 in China, Burma, and India, 
known as the CBI Theater. (See Appendix B, Maps of the CBI Theater.) 
Trained by the educational system of their own country, these Americans used 
every fiber of their intellects to thwart the enemy. The Flying Tigers exhibited 
natural and learned leadership and administrative skills in their battle for 
freedom. This is their story of the part they played, whether significant or 
unimportant, in this phase of United States history and how their leadership 
relates to the current educational environment.
On the morning of 7 December 1941, at 7:55 A.M., Japanese airplanes 
attacked Hickam Field and Pearl Harbor on the island of Oahu in Hawaii.
Four days later, Germany and Italy joined Japan in a declaration of war against 
the United States. Nearly four years later, the United States ended the war by 
releasing a single atom bomb over Nagasaki from a B-29 four-engine bomber 
on 9 August 1945. Between the first bomb dropped on the United States to 
the final bomb dropped by American pilots, many lives were lost, but the 
United States and her allies were victorious against the Axis powers.
The 22nd Bomb Squadron, 341st Bomb Group, 69th Composite Wing, 
Fourteenth Air Force, the Flying Tigers, China-Burma-India, Asiatic-Pacific 
Theater, played a significant role in helping the United States of America
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defeat the Axis powers of Japan and Germany. Yet, in 1939, this group simply 
did not exist, for it had been neither visualized nor materialized as it had not 
been needed before.
An Overview of the United States Army during World War II 
The army developed by the United States to fight World War II 
represented a kind of artistry and truly expressed the spirit of its age like great 
architecture or poetry or music. This new army was idealistic, inventive, and 
optimistic. Had it failed, the world would still be reeling from the crash.
The army created by the United States for World War II went to war 
and never lost a campaign. Losses involving Americans were minimal. The 
fall of the Philippines, directed by Americans, for example, was actually fought 
by Filipinos. In fact, the war-time army lost only one battle, at Sidi-bou-Zid in 
Tunisia, of more than one hundred fought around the world. Further, 
Americans suffered only one other major check which transpired at the Rapido 
River crossing. In conclusion, nothing in the annals of war compares with this 
army, and no other army ever compiled a comparable record of victories.1
An Overview of Aviation History Prior to World War II 
In order to understand the need for the 22nd Bomb Squadron, it is 
helpful to review the first four decades of aviation history. Since Orville and
1 Geoffrey Perret, There’s A War to Be Won: The United States Army in 
World War II (New York: Random House, 1991), xxvi-xxviii.
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Wilbur Wright flew their plane at Kitty Hawk in 1903, World War II was only 
the second time that the United States had entered a major air war. Although 
Americans had invented the airplane, its development and military adaptation 
were delegated to other nations.
The army purchased its first airplane in 1909. Congress authorized the 
army’s first special appropriation for aviation, in the amount of $125,000, in 
1911. By 1914, the United States ranked fourteenth in total funds appropriated 
for aviation, well below countries such as Greece and Bulgaria. From 1909 to 
April 1917 when the United States entered World War I, the army had 
acquired only 224 aircraft, and none was a combat model and few were still in 
commission when finally needed. At the time war was declared, the Army had 
only two flying fields and 55 trainers. In fact, General Pershing later remarked 
of the trainers, "Fifty-one were obsolete and the other four obsolescent."2
Even though the only requisites for air power are raw materials and 
enthusiasm, it is obvious that the United States literally had no air force in 
1917. For World War I, however, little psychological or material preparation 
had occurred because of a lack of lead time. On the other hand, during the 
long truce between the two world wars, people understood clearly, certainly by 
1939, that peace could not be sustained. Consequently, the period between
2 Ibid., 6-7.
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1939 and 1941 witnessed hurried re-armament. Even so, when war came, the 
United States was not quite prepared.
The history of the Army air arm, the Air Service, during the period from 
1917 through 1941 reflects the general pattern set by United States military 
policies. Created from no previous experience, the Air Service had just over 
two months of combat experience in France in World War I followed by a 
peacetime period. As a result, in 1919, the Air Service was rapidly and 
thoroughly demobilized. In addition, following World War I, national military 
policy opposed a large and expensive establishment in the interest of world 
peace and domestic economy. The Air Service, as the junior member of the 
military with no control over its own future, died of a lack of funds and 
personnel. In 1939, however, as the nation began again to gird for war, the 
need for expansion of the Air Corps was conditioned by the efficacy of the Air 
Service during World War I as well as by two decades of peace.3
Unfortunately, the story of the Air Service during World War I, upon 
which their existence in World War II depended, had been more of promise 
than of achievement. Their combat record, although excellent, was brief, and it 
was far more modest than the public was led to expect or believe. Official 
reports of the activities of the Air Service during wartime were a combination 
of statistics and apology and, therefore, failed to achieve their brave promises
3 Wesley F. Craven and James S. Cate, The Army Air Forces in World 
War II. Volume One (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1948), 3-5.
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of 1917. As a result, the extravagant assurances of the Air Service received a 
great deal of public criticism because of the public perception of the feebleness 
of the air effort. In order to keep the Air Service alive, those in charge of 
military aviation, who were both civilians and officers, made rash predictions in 
order to secure support for unprecedented amounts of appropriations. Their 
claims, however, were totally unwarranted and resulted in bitter reactions from 
both politicians and the public upon exposure.4 A summary of the 
development of aviation is described as a time line in Table 1.
The Problem of Organization and Leadership in the Air Service 
The first Army aviation office was set up as the Aeronautical Division of 
the Signal Corps on 1 August 1907. The Chief Signal Officer was no aviator; 
therefore, with so small an officer corps, the Army Signal Corps turned to 
civilian sources for leadership. Of course, at that time, few had knowledge 
either of aviation requirements or military procedure. To provide legitimacy to 
the Air Service, a law of 1 October 1917 gave to the Aircraft Production Board, 
a subsidiary of the Council of National Defense, legal status as the Aircraft 
Board. This new entity was headed by a civilian and contained two other 
civilians and six officers, three each from the Army and Navy. The purpose of 
this panel was to supervise and direct the purchase and production of all
4 Ibid., 5.
27
aircraft engines and related materials, as authorized by the Secretary of War 
and the Secretary of the Navy.
Table 1 
Aviation Time Line
Year Event
1903 Orville and Wilbur Wright fly the first airplane at Kitty Hawk, NC
1907 First Army aviation office, Aeronautical Division of Signal Corps, 
established
1909 Army purchases first airplane
1911 Congress appropriates $125,000 for aviation
April 1917 United States enters World War I
October 1917 Aircraft Board created
1917 Foulois appointed Chief of Air Service
1918 Patrick replaces Foulois
November 1918 World War I Armistice
1919 Air Service demobilized
1926 Army Air Corps created
1935 GHQ Air Force established
1935 XB-17 tested
1937 B-17 power overestimated
1939 Office of the Chief of the Air Corps (OCAC) created
1939 Greater appropriations mark the beginning of Air Corps expansion
1940 Expansion by 2,400% of American aircraft industry
1941 Air power used as a striking force
1941 AWPD/1, World War II air doctrine, developed
June 20, 1941 Army Air Force established
28
In spite of the establishment of the Aircraft Board, the organization and 
training of air units continued to be the responsibility of the Chief Signal 
Officer, who did not have a controlling voice in the production of material. As 
a result, the air program assumed a position of semi-detachment from the rest 
of the war effort with a shaky organization and no precedent to serve as a 
guide. American leaders, therefore, turned to European Allies for advice, for, 
although they had plenty of money, Americans had no precise knowledge of 
aviation requirements.
The European consultants did not understand the situation in America, 
however, so coordination with the overall military program was faulty. In spite 
of this lack of assistance, in July 1918, an extensive training program was 
inaugurated using American universities for ground school training and newly- 
built fields for primary flight instruction. Advanced flight training was 
scheduled overseas where the combat experience of the Allies could be 
exploited. In addition, instruction in mechanics was similarly divided between 
American and European schools.5
Brig. Gen. Benjamin D. Foulois was appointed by General Pershing to 
the position of Chief of Air Service in November 1917. Foulois brought with 
him a large staff including recently commissioned civilians. As a result of this 
mix of career and civilian officers, internal jealousies flared. Also, air and
5 Ibid., 7-8.
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ground officers hated one another, and no one in the Air Service was willing to 
take advice from men who resolutely refused to enter a plane. The interaction 
involved ground officers who accused aviators of being temperamental, 
undisciplined, and disorderly. In fact, while General Pershing perceived these 
new Air Service men to be of quality, he also felt that General Foulois had 
them running around in circles.
Because of his disappointment with Foulois, on 29 May 1918, General 
Pershing appointed in his place Brig. Gen. Mason M. Patrick, an engineer who 
had never been in an airplane. Simultaneously, the whole administrative 
structure of the Air Service was revamped. By Armistice Day in November, 
only forty-five squadrons had been assigned to the front. Even at that point, 
the American Air Force was dwarfed by that of the Germans, the British, and 
the French. In spite of its limitations, however, the Air Service had shot down 
781 enemy planes.6 Further, while the Armistice brought relief from battle, 
the Air Service continued as the War Department’s anomaly. This resulted in 
negative attitudes by and towards the Air Service.
The three paramount trends of the period related to the creation of a 
real air force in the United States were the effort to establish an independent 
air force, the development of a doctrine of strategic bombardment, and the 
search for a heavy bomber. From 1919 to 1939, those goals permeated all
6 Ibid., 9-12.
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efforts in the development of the air force which was ultimately required to 
wage the war begun in December 1941.
Most important was the fight for the independence of military 
aeronautics. Originally a jurisdictional problem within the Army, it became a 
major national issue when the aggressor nations began to march in the mid- 
thirties. Before that, the problem of national defense seemed to many 
Americans simply an academic exercise invented by the militarists. World War 
I, the war to end all wars, created widespread skepticism and profound distaste 
for militarism and for war in general. In addition, neither isolationism nor 
pacifism, neither the Great Depression nor the New Deal was conducive to 
heavy expenditures for the Army and Navy.
Similar to the situation in government spending today, in the inevitable 
competition for limited funds the requests of each service were guided by its 
peculiar philosophy of national security. For example, the Navy wanted a 
strong battle fleet, and the Army to increase its size. The Air Service, on the 
other hand, favored a small body of highly trained professionals welded into a 
compact striking force ready for instant service. This proactive view found 
little support in the General Staff, composed exclusively of ground officers who 
were only mildly interested in air power. Further alienating itself, the Air 
Service requested a separate budget.7
7 Ibid., 18-19.
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Other sources of friction within the Air Service included personal
ambition, rivalry, the tendency toward empire building, and service loyalties
and jealousies. The Air Service had few general officers, and promotions were
controlled inexorably by seniority, and pilots found themselves many files
behind ground officers because their training took longer. In addition, few
pilots had graduated from West Point and they were discriminated against on
that basis as well. The underlying issue, however, was clearly a negative
attitude toward the airplane and air power.
To most airmen the plane was a genus rather than a species. The
airplane was a new and unique instrument of destruction of such revolutionary
potential that it demanded a sweeping reorganization of the national defense
structure. Only by securing a considerable measure of autonomy could the Air
Service formulate its own combat doctrines, develop appropriate equipment,
and direct its forces in battle. Representative Fiorello H. La Guardia of New
York, an aviator in World War I and an ardent supporter of the independent
air force, testified in 1926:
There is one obstacle in the way of new legislation, Mr. Chairman. That 
is the General Staff. If this committee does not lock the doors to the 
General Staff, you will not get a bill through.. .  The General Staff are 
either hopelessly stupid or unpardonably guilty in refusing to recognize 
the necessity of making a change in aviation.8
8 Ibid., 23.
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The far-reaching and permanent changes demanded legislative sanction; as a 
result, much of the struggle was aired publicly.9
The Need for Air Power during World War II
Several new planes were invented after World War I. For example, in
July 1935, the XB-17 underwent its first test flight with an average speed of 232
miles per hour and a range of 2,100 miles. Delivered as the B-17 in 1937, it
was enthusiastically received and was seen as an excellent bombardment
aircraft for coastal defense. The Air Service was limited, however, to flying
seaward only one hundred miles beyond the shore at that time. In addition, a
range of only 2,100 miles would not enable a plane to cross an ocean.
To rectify this problem, the Douglas XB-19, the Army’s largest prewar
bomber with a range of 5,200 miles, was delivered on 27 June 1941.
Unfortunately, the size and weight of the plane were too great for the power
plants. This factor necessitated the creation of the B-29. This rapid
technological development inspired commanding general of the GHQ Air
Force, Frank M. Andrews, to urge in June 1937,
The world struggle for strategic air bases and effective air fleets is well 
under way and will become intensified with the fast moving technical 
development of the airplane. Air power is as vital a requirement to the 
military efficiency of a great nation as land power and sea power, and 
there is no hope for victoiy in war for a nation in which it is lacking.10
9 Ibid., 20-23.
10 Greer, 92.
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The International Perspective on Air Power Before World War II 
While debate about the existence of an independent air force and the 
development of more powerful bombers raged in the United States, it was clear 
that Japan, Italy, and Germany had already recognized the airplane to be a 
worthy weapon in achieving their goals of expansion, but they varied in the 
doctrine, material, and organization which characterized their air arms. Similar 
considerations determined the status of air preparations in Great Britain, 
France, and other nations opposing the Axis powers. The clues were obvious, 
even at that time, that air power would be an important and possibly decisive 
factor in the outcome of World War II.
The Japanese had tested air power in their undeclared war against 
China, and the Russo-Manchurian border fighting in 1939 gained them valuable 
combat experience. In Europe, the Rome-Berlin Axis seized upon the Spanish 
Civil War of 1936-1939 as a proving ground for their weapons. In addition, the 
Italian conquest of Ethiopia in the mid-thirties involved the use of warplanes in 
tactical experiments. These gave the totalitarian powers an initial advantage 
over the allies. The veil of censorship effectively concealed the activities and 
potential of the Japanese air forces. As a result, American air officials tended 
to underestimate those forces.11
11 Ibid., 75-76.
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The United States Responds to World Aggression 
by Building Air Defense 
As early as 28 January 1938, President Roosevelt declared United States 
national defenses inadequate in the face of warlike preparations abroad which 
were threatening world peace and security. He then asked for appropriations 
to improve American defense capabilities. A year later, on 12 January 1939, 
he asked for a larger sum, and the Air Corps accounted for more than half the 
total requests. These appropriations marked the beginning of a radical change 
in our foreign policy and marked the beginning of Air Corps expansion which 
then peaked in 1944.
President Roosevelt had urged that $300 million be appropriated to 
purchase aircraft for the Army. On 16 May 1940, with the extension of the war 
in western Europe including the fall of France and the Battle of Britain, the 
President called for an annual output of 50,000 aircraft and equal air strength 
between the Army and the Navy. The American aircraft industry was asked to 
expand its normal capacity of 2,000 planes a year to more than 4,000 a month, 
an increase of 2,400 percent over the previous year. The proximity of the war 
in Western Europe lent a grim incentive to American efforts.12 As a result, 
by the time the United States entered World War II, the Air Corps had in 
production heavy bombers--B-17s and B-24s, medium bombers-B-25s and B-
12 Ibid., 101-108.
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26s, light bombers--A-20s and A-24s, and pursuits-P-38s, P-39s, P-40s, and P- 
47s.
Preparation by the United States for World War II 
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor thrust the United States into a 
war for survival. Consequently, the nation’s forces were marshalled on land, on 
sea, and in the air. Uniquely, for the first time in military history, air power 
was employed as a striking force. This factor drastically altered the course and 
nature of the struggle and decisively influenced the outcome.
Where did American air power come from? It was the product of men 
and machines. It also depended upon practical and usable ideas. The air 
force, still in its infancy, had neither traditions nor theories developed over 
long centuries of experience. Air warfare entered the war scene with dramatic 
suddenness and, in an incredibly short time, presented awesome and 
revolutionary weapons of destruction. Consequently, human imagination was 
staggered by this new medium which required vision for optimum use for both 
offense and defense. Beyond this challenge, stakes were enormously high in 
terms of national power and survival.
According to Major George Fielding Eliot, the history of civilization 
recounts three revolutionary military inventions or discoveries: discipline, 
gunpowder, and the airplane. The airplane has provided warfare not only the 
means of striking the enemy’s army or navy, but also the ability to hit directly 
the source and seat of power, the citizenry, the capital city, and the political,
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industrial, and commercial centers without having to overthrow the enemy’s 
armed forces.13
The Development of Air Doctrine 
The development of air doctrine is a stoiy of an unprecedented 
intellectual achievement involving bold imagination, stern logic, and new 
patterns of thought. Persistence was also evident in the face of fierce 
opposition, vested interest, and rigid thinking. By the time the crucial test 
came in 1941, America had the makings of air power--both the men and 
machines as well as a carefully developed doctrine which could readily be 
translated into a plan of military action. While the soundness of that doctrine 
has been affirmed by the positive results of America’s air war, it is important to 
examine the correct and incorrect steps taken by the air arm during its 
formative period between 1917 and 1941 which ultimately led to the creation of 
the Flying Tigers.M Table 2 outlines the development of United States air 
doctrine before entry into World War II.
13 Greer, vii.
14 Ibid., vii.
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Table 2
Development of United States Air Doctrine 1917 - 194115
Period Developer Principles
1917 - 1918 Army Air Arm Only test of American airmen and 
equipment prior to World War II
1919 -1926 Heroic Age of Doctrinal 
Development
Army Air Corps established
1926 - 1935 Air Force Idea Technological advances in airplane design 
and production
Establishment of the GHQ Air Force
1935 - 1939 Refinement and 
Substantiation of the Long- 
range Bomber Concept
Created Office of the Chief of the Air 
Corps (OCAC)
1939 - 1941 Preparation of Air Doctrine 
for World War II
AWPD/1 document approved 
Army Air Force established
The Fight for Air Force Autonomy 
The agitation for a separate branch did not come from the airmen, but 
rather it emanated from Rep. James Hay, Chairman of the House Committee 
on Military Affairs, in February 1913. The proposed bill would have created a 
separate Air Corps as a line component of the Army. Hearings showed, 
however, that most military men, including flyers, were opposed to separation 
at that time. For example, acting Chief Signal Officer Col. George P. Scriven 
felt that aviators were young men without the requisite scientific knowledge 
and mature judgement. Other future leaders of American air power such as 
Benjamin D. Foulois, Henry H. Arnold, and William Mitchell thought it was
15 Ibid., v-vi.
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too early for a separate Air Corps but that separation was only a matter of 
time. Captain Paul Beck, another leader, favored separation and charged that 
the longer the Signal Corps controlled aeronautics, the smaller the potential for 
autonomy. As a result, the rift between aviators and their non-flying superiors 
continued to widen.
American forces in 1917 also had to move from the field of theory to 
the field of action. This tended to strengthen the influence of the ground 
officers because the war had to be fought with available weapons, and the 
battle on the Western Front was already frozen in a complex pattern of ground 
operations. It was a struggle of infantry, trenches, and artillery; of attack and 
counterattack; of attrition and reinforcement. The high command regarded air 
operations as an adjunct to the mighty ground forces which had been 
committed to mortal and decisive combat rather than as a strength unto itself.
A proponent of an autonomous air force, General Billy Mitchell was 
court-martialed for unbecoming conduct on 17 December 1925 and was 
suspended from duty for five years. After he resigned from the army on 27 
January 1926, the supporters of air power retreated in disillusionment to more 
moderate ground. As a result, the Army Air Corps was created in 1926.
After 1926, the tenor of the arguments changed because of technological 
advances in aircraft design and production. Many new developments like the 
creation of the high-speed bomber, the two-engine B-9 and B-10, and the 
four-engine B-17 Flying Fortress as well as the move of the Air Corps Tactical
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School from Langley to Maxwell Field, Alabama, helped the cause of 
autonomy. At Maxwell Field, airmen were able to wrestle vigorously with 
problems such as the nature of war, the employment of air power, and the 
tactical doctrines of aviation. The General Headquarters (GHQ) Air Force 
became a reality in 1935.16
Struggles in China, Ethiopia, and Spain during the 1930s were neither 
major wars nor real trials of modern air power. They were, instead, limited 
proving grounds for weapons and techniques of aviation support. The new 
direction was not set until President Roosevelt promoted air power build-up in 
1937. On 1 March 1939, Roosevelt gave jurisdiction of the GHQ Air Force to 
the Chief of the Air Corps and created the Office of the Chief of the Air Corps 
(OCAC).17
By 1939, the development of air doctrine accelerated because of Hitler’s 
obvious bid for superiority. As more and more of the countries of the world 
became involved in the struggle against Axis domination, the pressure to add to 
the demand for powerful military aviation became intense. In July 1941, the 
United States air planners in Washington were required to transform their 
theories of air doctrine into a practical plan for air action against the nation’s 
potential enemies. This document was designated AWPD/1 and was submitted
16 Greer, 44-75.
17 Ibid., 76-106.
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to and approved by the War Department. AWPD/1 served as the actual 
blueprint for air operations against the Axis powers.
The War Department and Congress finally understood the need for an 
autonomous air force. Consequently, the Army Air Force was established on 
20 June 1941 in Army Regulation 95-5. Directed by a chief who also served as 
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Air and coordinated all the activities of military 
aviation, the commander was aided by the Chief of the Air Corps, who was still 
charged primarily with training and material, and by the Commanding General, 
Air Force Combat Command, which was a redesignation for GHQ Air Force.
In addition, an Air Council comprised of the Assistant Secretary of War for 
Air, the Chief of Army Air Forces, the Chief of the War Plans Division, the 
Chief of the Air Corps, the Commanding General of the Air Force Combat 
Command, and other members as appointed by the Secretary was established 
to make periodic reviews and to coordinate major aviation projects of the 
Army. This was the organizational structure in place for the United States Air 
Force on 7 December 1941. (See Appendix C, Organizational Chart and 
Tactical Unit History).18 The infrastructure for successful air power was now 
in place.
18 Greer, 107-127.
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The Birth of the 22nd Bomb Squadron 
Prior to its reorganization as the 22nd Bomb Squadron in 1938, the 22nd 
Aero Shooting Star Squadron saw action on the Western Front during World 
War I from September 1918 until the Armistice, 11 November 1918. Based at 
Belrain, Souilly, and Toulon, France, it fought as a pursuit squadron, and the 
unit shot down thirty-five German planes and sustained the loss of seventeen 
pilots. An exemplary leader, Lt. Gen. Carl Spaatz, then a lieutenant, was 
among the daredevils who flew the rickety airplanes, started the 22nd on its 
historical path, and won a Distinguished Flying Cross (DFC) for shooting down 
two enemy aircraft.19 Three years before the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, 
on 1 November 1938, the 22nd Bomb Squadron (H)20, 7th Bomb Group (H), 
was reorganized at Hamilton Field, California.
The 22nd Bomb Squadron at the Beginning of World War II 
On 7 December 1941, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was a part of the 7th 
Bomb Group and was comprised of B-17s; therefore, it was considered a heavy- 
bomb group unit. At the moment of the Japanese attack, some of this group 
were flying unarmed to Pearl Harbor from their base on the mainland. They 
were forced to circle helplessly while the Japanese fighters and bombers were
19 Fred M. Sibley and Donald E. Tewes, The Bombing Bulldogs. 22nd 
Bombardment Squadron (New York: Commanding General, Fourteenth Air 
Force, 1945), 11.
20 H  denotes heavy bombers.
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unleashing their missiles on United States territory. Historically, this incident 
gave rise to the 22nd Bomb Squadron, which later became part of the Flying 
Tigers, in World War II.21
The Rebirth of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, Bombing Eagles, in 1942
According to official records, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was activated, or 
reborn, pursuant to General Order (GO) #84, Headquarters, 3rd Air Force, 
Tampa, Florida, dated 26 April 1942, retroactive to 4 April 1942. Attached to 
the 17th Bombardment Group (M)22 for training and personnel, the 22nd 
Bomb Squadron was assigned through Special Order (SO) #71, Columbia 
Army Air Base, SO #5, 67th Observation Group, Sub Base, Esler Field, 
Louisiana, SO #116, Key Field, Mississippi, and by further orders attached to 
the 17th Bomb Group and other organizations for rations.23 The insignia 
under which the Bombing Eagles flew is located in Appendix D.
The development of the 22nd Bomb Squadron can be traced from its 
military infancy in Columbia, South Carolina, through the year 1942. In that 
year, it became a full-fledged bombing unit in the China-Burma-lndia (CBI)
21 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 22nd Bomb Squadron. 
1941-1945. Documents - Copies on File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 7-20 July 
1994), 1941 Files.
22 M  denotes medium bombers.
23 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 22nd Bomb Squadron. 
1941-1945. Documents - Copies on File, (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 7-20 July 
1994), 1942 Files.
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Theater, part of the Asiatic-Pacific Theater of Combat, under the command of 
the United States Army Air Force. The new recruits came from Georgia, New 
Jersey, Washington, and Kansas; from Fort Worth, Chicago, New York City, 
and Portland; from large cities, small towns, and farms. They had been 
machinists, farmers, jewelers, singers, teachers, doctors, and factory workers. 
Some had made their careers with the army, while others had just entered.
The national emergency known as World War II had transformed them into 
pilots, bombardiers, mechanics, ambulance drivers, bomb sight experts, and 
supply clerks. From widely separated camps, they were expedited to Columbia, 
South Carolina, the birthplace and nucleus of the squadron.24
Deployment began shortly after Pearl Harbor. The 22nd Bomb 
Squadron (H) Engineering Section moved to Amberly Field, thirty-five miles 
from Brisbane, Australia, on 24 December 1941. That group remained there to 
assemble P-40 fighters and A-24 dive bombers. The 22nd and 11th Bomb 
Squadrons (H) embarked on board the U.S.S. President Polk on 17 January 
1942 and arrived at Java about 28 January 1942. Further, the Air Echelon 
began to reach Java about 3 Januaiy 1942 under the command of Major 
Hobson. On the night of 25 February 1942, the 22nd and 11th Bomb 
Squadrons (H) evacuated Java and returned to Australia in order to become 
part of the 19th Bomb Group (H). Before they could reach Australia,
24 Ibid., 1942 Files.
44
however, they were redirected to India and arrived in Karachi on 13 March 
1942. In the meantime, the remainder of the 7th Bomb Group (H), consisting 
of the Headquarters Squadron, 9th Bomb Squadron, and 88th Reconnaissance 
Squadron, attached, sailed from Brisbane, Australia, on 4 February 1942 to join 
the Air Echelon in Java.23
On 26 April 1942 at Columbia, South Carolina, the Ground Echelon of 
the 22nd Bomb Squadron (M) was activated and embarked from Charleston on 
28 May 1942 bound for India to operate with the 7th Bomb Group. The Air 
Echelon of the original 22nd Bomb Squadron (M), formed from Project #157 
at Columbia was commanded by Lt. Blair M. Sorensen and was composed of 
officers and enlisted men from the 17th Bomb Group and the 89th 
Reconnaissance Squadron of the Columbia Army Air Base. The Air Echelon 
embarked for Morrison Field, West Palm Beach, Florida, after two weeks of 
training in Columbia and were joined by members of the 11th Bomb 
Squadron’s Air Echelon which was part of the same squadron. The first flight 
departed the continental limits of the United States on 1 May 1942, destination 
Karachi, India, via Pan American Airways’ South Atlantic Ferry Route.
Not everyone made it to India. One leader, Lt. Daniel E. Kelly, landed 
in Vichy French territory, and he and his crew were interned for the duration 
of World War II. Lt. Eero A. Wiitala, another leader, ran out of fuel and
25 Ibid., 1942 Files.
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landed on a beach on the coast of Liberia damaging his landing gear. The 
airplane was later salvaged for parts. Lt. Keith H. Thomas and crew on yet 
another plane were presumed lost in a thunderstorm approximately thirty 
minutes after taking off at Accra. They were never found. With only minor 
repairs, the remainder of the squadron arrived at Karachi, India, on 16 May 
1942, with Lt. Joseph L. Skeldon, Lt. Robert V. Ford, and Lt. Blair M.
Sorensen and their crews arriving first.
War duties began immediately. Lieutenant Sorensen was directed to fly 
a secret mission to China for the purpose of surveying the possibility of 
operating aircraft in combat there. The 11th Bomb Squadron was reorganized 
and combined with crews from the 22nd Bomb Squadron to bring it to full 
strength. The 11th Bomb Squadron then flew to China where they stayed until 
the end of the war. The remaining crews of the 22nd Bomb Squadron were 
attached to the Headquarters and Headquarters Squadron of the 7th Bomb 
Group (H) and were assigned special duties throughout India such as 
reconnaissance, coastal patrol work, and bombing missions to Burma.26
On 15 September 1942, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was made a part of 
the 341st Bomb Group, Tenth Air Force, by General Order #5, Karachi Air 
Defense Area, Karachi, India. That meant that the 22nd Bomb Squadron had 
become a full-fledged member of the CBI theater of operations within the
26 Ibid., 1942 Files.
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Asiatic-Pacific Theater. In addition, the 491st Bomb Squadron was activated 
and assigned to the 341st Bomb Group. To lead the 491st Bomb Squadron, 1st 
Lt. James D. Pigg, 1st Lt. Edward Garrett, and 2nd Lt. Frank I. Redman were 
assigned.
The Problem of Leadership in the CBI Theater 
Six Army air forces figured in the CBI equation:
• Fifth (Southwest Pacific)
Seventh (Central Pacific)
• Tenth (India-Burma)
• Eleventh (North Pacific)
• Thirteenth (South Pacific)
• Fourteenth (China)
Widely scattered throughout the Pacific and the CBI, these separate air forces 
performed in isolation. As a result, they became characterized by the quality 
of their leaders so that each was unique. Further, the war against Japan lacked 
unity of command which exaggerated the eccentricities of the groups. While 
United States forces in World War II reflected a somewhat disjointed nature 
from theater to theater, the goal, in theory at least, was to undergird all 
operations with an over-all strategy formulated by the Combined Chiefs of Staff 
(CCS) and with a common dependence upon a single pool for material 
resources.
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Two particular problems inhibited the success of the Allies. The 
logistical problem in CBI was more formidable than in any other theater 
because of the distance from either the United States or the United Kingdom. 
Compounding the problem, transport facilities were unequal to wartime needs. 
Even China was totally dependent for supplies upon airlifts operating under 
grave natural and military hazards.27
The second problem was the lack of a common objective besides the 
defeat of Japan among the Allied powers. Because the political aims of the 
Chinese, the British, and the Americans diverged substantially, any agreement 
on strategy was forestalled, and a command system of bewildering complexity 
was fostered. Even among United States generals there was a lamentable lack 
of accord.
The United States was quite clear on its goal in the CBI Theater. The 
chief aim was to help keep China in the war by providing lend-lease materials 
and technical assistance. This objective involved little in the way of ground 
force commitments, so service and air forces constituted the main contribution. 
The Tenth Air Force’s mission was to protect the Hump air route over the 
Himalayan mountain range between India and China by which China was 
nourished and to aid in clearing a trace for the Ledo Road which was to 
supplement the airlift with a ground line of communication (LOC) from Burma
27 Perret, vii.
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to Running. The Fourteenth Air Force in China helped guard the Hump 
Route, aided Chinese ground operations, and attacked Japanese air forces and 
shipping.28 (Refer to Appendix E for appreciation from the Chinese.)
The Tenth Air Force 
Air transport played a unique role in China where the Hump airlift was 
the sole means of supply and where air activities were limited less by the size 
of United States forces than by the tonnage available for fuel, bombs, and 
ammunition. In the CBI Theater, primitive rail and highway systems imposed a 
heavy brake on the movement of material. Supply and maintenance suffered 
also from a dearth of proper facilities handicapped by low priorities and 
difficult lines of communication. On the bright side, improvements occurred 
eventually so that some rear-area bases were comparatively well-equipped. At 
advance bases, however, facilities remained primitive, temporary, and 
makeshift. As a result, aviation engineers developed great skill in the rapid 
development of airstrips and other installations, and stories of ingenious 
improvisations in maintenance and modification have become almost legendary. 
At times, however, the plentiful use of bailing wire and tin cans could not keep 
the planes operable in spite of Yankee ingenuity.
Primitive conditions in the forward bases affected men as well as 
machines. In the tropical jungles of India and the crude situation of China,
28 Ibid., viii.
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climate, disease, and fatigue took their toll. Air crews and ground crews lived 
constantly in tents and on field rations. War is not intended to be pleasant and 
the circumstances that shape morale are complex; however, the Pacific and 
Asiatic theaters generally suffered in comparison with the European Theaters 
of Operations (ETO) and the Mediterranean Theater of Operations (MTO) 
insofar as the Army Air Force (AAF) was concerned.29
Conflict Within the Tenth Air Force 
Even before the United States entered World War II, President 
Roosevelt appointed Gen. Claire Chennault (Appendix F), a retired career 
military man, to assist China in its defense against Japan. Chennault, an 
instructor at Maxwell Air Force Base, was a leader and free-thinker, not a yes 
man who followed instructions without questioning. He was able to develop a 
positive relationship on behalf of the United States with both Chiang-Kai-Shek 
and Mao Tse-Tung, Chinese leaders, so that the president could initiate a lend- 
lease program for supplies and equipment with them. Chennault, who had 
written a book on pursuit flying, also became the leader of the American 
Volunteer Group (AVG), a band of mercenaries consisting of pilots and 
mechanics who received a $500 bonus from the Chinese for every Japanese 
plane they shot down.
29 Ibid., ix-xiii.
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A significant part of General Chennault’s plan was his demand of a free 
hand in the employment of air forces in China; he disliked subordination to the 
Tenth Air Force. Friction had developed with Gen. Bissell, who came to the 
CBI theater as Gen. Joseph W. Stilwell’s air adviser and later became 
commanding general of the Tenth Air Force. In fact, Bissell was purposely 
given one day’s seniority over Chennault in his promotion to brigadier general.
On the other hand, Chennault enjoyed the special confidence of Chiang 
Kai-shek and the applause of the Chinese people. The Generalissimo had 
been disappointed by the failure of the Americans to place a larger air force in 
China, and he was suspicious of British influence over the India-based Tenth 
Air Force. He seemed also to have anticipated making use of the proposed 
change in command arrangements to resurrect the moribund Chinese Air Force 
which included trained pilots but had no aircraft. These issues, rooted in 
differing concepts of strategy, came into focus at the beginning of 1943 with the 
question of an independent air force for Chennault.30
The Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) met at Casablanca in January 1943 
to discuss the intrinsically complex problem of the CBI Theater. General 
Stilwell persisted in the belief that it would be necessary to reopen a land route 
to China using Chinese armies which he had trained and would lead. After all, 
he had already trained 45,000 Chinese troops at Ramgarh, India, in the
30 Craven and Cate, 436-437.
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summer and fall of 1942 as the X  Force. He had twenty-seven divisions of 
Chinese in Yunan Province, the Y  Force, to collaborate with his X Force. He 
would then use the X and Y forces as a pincer movement forcing the Japanese 
out of Northern Burma. His plan was to build a new road behind the X Force 
as it advanced southeastward from Ledo in India until land communications 
could be reestablished with China by the juncture of the two forces.
Chennault bitterly opposed this strategy because he felt that Stilwell had 
overlooked a unique opportunity to use air weapons. In addition, he strongly 
believed that Stilwell’s strategy would only prolong the war and that the 
manpower should be used to construct additional airfields in Assam, India, and 
China for the building of an effective air force in China. Chennault proposed 
instead to destroy Japanese air power in China by employing 500 aircraft 
deployed from Chinese bases. This modest use of air power would be more 
strategically located and would be better able to infiltrate the most vulnerable 
points held by the Japanese.31
The 22nd Bomb Squadron’s mission for 1943 was to support the 
campaign in Burma to rid the Japanese of their positions. Flying out of 
Chakulia, India, their responsibility was to harass and destroy the enemy by sea 
and by land. Although hampered by monsoons and inadequate supplies, they 
were successful.
31 Ibid, 435-436.
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The Japanese ground forces, supported by their Navy, had moved swiftly 
north in Burma and were opposed by the British Burma 1st Division, the 
Indian 17th Division, and the Chinese 5th and 6th Army under the command of 
General Stilwell. The Japanese outnumbered the Allied defenders in Burma, 
drove toward Toungoo, and attacked Magwe Airfield, destroying nine Blenheim 
bombers and three AVG P-40s and shooting down three defending Hurricane 
fighters. On 2 April 1942, Prome, on the Irrawaddy River, fell.
Shortly after, the Japanese carrier force of she moved into the Indian 
Ocean. Airplanes of their strike force sank the British cruisers Dorsetshire and 
Cornwall, heavily bombed Colombo and Trincomalee on Ceylon Island, raided 
shipping on the Indian Ocean and in the Bay of Bengal, sank fifteen ships, and 
sank the British aircraft carrier Hermes. The Japanese ships landed 
reinforcements at Rangoon on 6 April 1942. Magwe and Meiktila were 
evacuated before the fast-moving enemy and the fall of Lashio, the terminus of 
the Burma Road into China, completed the total blockade of China by the 
Japanese.
At this point, the Japanese controlled central Burma, so the Allied 
forces were ordered back to positions along the Indian border. Mandalay was 
evacuated on 30 April; Akyab, on 4 May; Myitkyina, on 8 May 1942. Allied 
forces subsequently established themselves north and south of Kalewa along 
the Naga Hills and the Chin Hills. Imphal, India, then became the hub behind
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the new lines. The fighting dwindled as the Monsoon season arrived and the 
Japanese immediately began consolidating their vast gains in Burma.32
Col. Robert L. Scott, one of Colonel Haynes’ ABC Ferry pilots, longed 
to fly a fighter rather than a transport. In April 1942, he convinced Claire L. 
Chennault, leader of the American Volunteer Group (AVG), that he could do 
something about the Japanese planes roaming free over northern Burma and 
endangering the flights of the ABC Ferry. Chennault gave Scott permission to 
take over the next P-40 arriving in India on its way to China. Colonel Scott 
took the P40-E to Dinjan, had a shark mouth painted on the nose, and flew it 
on 30 April 1942.
On 5 May, Colonel Scott flew alone, hunting the enemy from Myitkyina 
to Lashio, and he spotted a twin-engine Sally bomber being refuelled in a 
comer of Lashio Airfield. He flew three passes, shot up the bomber which 
caught fire, and watched it burn. This was the first Japanese plane destroyed 
by a Tenth Air Force fighter. On the same mission, Scott also effectively 
strafed a column of Japanese troops and set four trucks on fire. In sixty-three 
days through the 1st of July, he and his lone P-40 E flew 371 hours, sometimes 
flying as many as four missions a day. He was a one-man fighter force over 
Burma, striking at troops, gun positions, vehicles, and barges. He even flew a 
few missions from China with the Flying Tigers. At the beginning of July 1942,
32 Kenn C. Rust Tenth Air Force Story. (Temple City, CA: Historical 
Aviation Album, 1980), 7-9.
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Scott was ordered to leave the ferry service and take command of the newly 
activated 23rd Fighter Group.33
From June-October 1942, ground fighting was minimal in Burma near 
the Indian border during the monsoon season, and both sides secured their 
positions. Brig. Gen. Earl S. Naiden became the third commander of the 
Tenth Air Force on 26 June 1942. On 4 July 1942, the AVG’s were disbanded 
in China and its planes and some of its pilots were inducted into the 23rd 
Fighter Group and activated the same day in Kunming. The 23rd was a 
mixture of the AVG, new pilots, and a Ground Echelon that had traveled from 
the United States to India along with the Headquarters section of the Tenth 
Air Force. The 23rd Fighter Group, plus the 16th Fighter Squadron and the 
11th Bomb Squadron (B-25 Mitchells), was placed under command of the 
China Air Task Force (CATF), a Tenth Air Force sub-command activated 
4 July 1942 with Chennault as its commander. In March 1943, the CTAF 
became the Fourteenth Air Force with Chennault as commanding general.
The Tenth Air Force in India had two weak groups with few aircraft-the 
partially equipped 51st Fighter Group and the slightly better furnished 7th 
Bomb Group, now a composite bomb group with heavy and medium squadrons. 
Of its two medium squadrons, the 11th was in China flying with CATF and the 
22nd was non-operational, lacking aircraft, spare parts, and personnel. Created
33 Ibid., 9.
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from almost nothing out of the ashes of the Java campaign, the 22nd was no 
better off than when it had started.34
The 22nd Bomb Squadron during 1943 
During 1943, the squadron members loyally flew and fought as they had 
been trained to do. They were unaware of any of the administrative and 
leadership controversies taking place in upper echelons within the CBI Theater 
which vitally affected their life-and-death struggles for survival.
The Fourteenth Air Force, Bombing Bulldogs, 
during 1944 in Yangkai, China
The 22nd Bomb Squadron (M), United States Army Air Force, was
transferred from the Tenth Air Force to the Fourteenth Air Force in January
1944. The advance echelon of the squadron departed from Chakulia, India, on
7 January 1944 and arrived in Yangkai, China, the next day. By the end of the
month, nearly all squadron personnel had been transported to the new station.
Some of the personnel and equipment were transported over the Hump by Air
Transport Command (ATC) in C-46s, C-47s, and C-54s, and some by squadron
B-25 Mitchells. The 22nd Bomb Squadron’s strength for that month included
74 officers and 268 enlisted men. Six were missing in action as of 23 January,
but they had not yet been dropped from the records; an additional 39 were
34 Ibid.
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transferred.35 The insignia of the Bombing Bulldogs is located in Appendix 
G.
Many more men arrived in Yangkai during February 1944. The B-25 
Mitchells which were waiting for engine changes at Chakulia and Chabua flew 
over the Hump as soon as they were able. The challenge for these planes was 
to fly at 18,000 feet using the super-charger. This required that all crew 
members wear oxygen masks when the temperature plummeted to below 
freezing. Even with using the super-charger, however, the fully-loaded aircraft 
struggled to maintain altitude and stability. Consequently, the trip over the 
Hump was a frightening experience even for the most hardened combat men. 
One group, in particular, who traveled in an unarmed transport sighted four 
Japanese Zero fighter aircraft which, fortunately, did not attack.
The types of missions were different from the Burma milk runs; flying in 
this theater became exciting with the low-level, mast-high missions. In the few 
weeks of operations, both the 22nd and the 491st Bomb Squadrons had 
inflicted such damage that this section of the Hanoi-Saigon railroad was closed 
to traffic for several months. The difficulties of February with bad weather, 
unfamiliar terrain, new bombing techniques, and plane and personnel losses all 
added up to a different stoiy: each crew returning from a successful mission 
reported something new. High altitude and mass bombing of a pin-point target
35 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 341st Bomb Group 
1941 - 1945 Documents. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1944 Files.
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were no longer routine. Instead, at most high levels the pilot could see the 
direct results of the attack. These missions required every crew member to 
engage his resourcefulness because they were all directly involved in the action. 
Even though the danger of each mission increased, the flying was never dull.36
The squadron divided geographically around the first of May. Eleven 
combat and ground crews were at Yunnanyi while the rest of the outfit 
remained at Yangkai. This venture was poorly planned because the length of 
the runway and the height of the surrounding hills made it inadvisable to use 
the field for tactical operations. On 6 May, Major Weatherly led the formation 
of planes with skeleton crews back to Yangkai, and the rest of the attachment 
followed by Air Transport Command (ATC) and motor convoy.
The squadron was fortunate to have no member missing or killed in 
action during July, but a tragedy occurred that gravely affected all personnel. 
Chaplain Thomas Clare was lost on a mission over the Hump. Returning to 
the United States to join his family, Chaplain Clare was flying in a B-24 four- 
engine bomber converted to a cargo/transport airplane. Sadly, it never 
reached its destination at Chabua, most likely having crashed in the mountains. 
This was not a solitary misfortune either. It was this tragedy, however, that 
capped the first two years since the 22nd Bomb Squadron had been born at 
Columbia, South Carolina. Despite a series of distressing growing pains, the
36 Ibid., 1944 Files.
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22nd Bomb Squadron developed into an effective arm of the Tenth Air Force 
and later the Fourteenth Air Force.
In July 1944, Major Loren S. Nickels replaced Major Edison C. 
Weatherly, squadron commander since October 1943. Major Nickels, an old 
China veteran with a good understanding of the problems of the CBI Theater, 
had been Operations Officer with the 341st Bomb Group and the 11th Bomb 
Squadron. With renewed high morale, the squadron flew 99 sorties with 76 
tons of bombs dropped, a record since their arrival in China despite the 
intermittent bad weather. Similary, September 1944 surpassed July as the 
month with the greatest number of flights in spite of consistently bad weather 
conditions. Although grounded several days at a time, when the sun shone and 
the weather officer gave the go-ahead, they flew a lot. That month there were 
113 sorties with 94 tons of bombs dropped on the enemy.
In October, command changed again. Major Philip Main assumed 
command of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, relieving Major Loren Nickels who 
returned to the interior zone. The total squadron strength that month was 313, 
and eight missions were flown by forty-two Mitchells. October 1944 wound up 
to be a dismal month of a tragic year, and with the recall of General Stilwell 
under extremely veiled and cloudy circumstances, the spirits of many an 
American in China reached a new low.37
37 Ibid., 1944 Files.
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The End of World War II 
Results of the efforts of the 22nd Bomb Squadron were difficult to 
evaluate because their targets were part of a long-range offense strategy. 
Missions covered a variety of targets including military installations, storage 
areas, and highway bridges. Towards the end of the operation, the squadron 
contributed direct support to the Chinese ground offensive and were awarded 
special commendation from the field commander as a result. For example, 
within two weeks of the squadron’s last sortie, the Burma-Ledo Road was 
declared officially open and the first convoy reached China. In total, the 
squadron had flown 385 sorties and dropped 286 tons of frags, incendiaries, and 
demolition bombs with only one serious injury. When the fighting was over at 
the end of 1944, the detachment broke camp and returned to the base by plane 
and truck convoy.
Rotations out of the CBI Theater increased by the end of 1944. Even 
after discharge, however, safety was not assured. For example, in February 
1945, all but one of the squadron members who had left early that month to 
return to the United States were reported missing somewhere between Chabua 
and Karachi, India. Details of the crash were reported in a letter by T/Sgt. 
Marvin Jacobs, the sole survivor. The transport had somehow wandered off 
course and crashed in the mountains of Tibet. Jacobs, fortunately, escaped 
with only a broken ankle and a severe shaking up. The locals who found him 
and took him to their village where he stayed for two weeks before two other
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men were able to parachute to him. For an additional ten days, Jacobs and his 
rescuers constructed a landing strip for an L-5, a light single engine aircraft 
with short field landing and take-off capabilities used in World War II for air 
ambulance service, which eventually brought Jacobs back to a hospital in India. 
This was the second similar tragedy and a bitter irony in squadron history in 
which successful combatants never made it home.
In February 1945, the 22nd Bomb Squadron was commanded by Lt. Col. 
Philip Main and based at Yangkai. In March, however, seven more 22nd 
Bomb Squadron men were heroically killed in action flying combat missions 
against the Japanese enemy. Only six missions were flown in April. While 
American troops were perceived to possess high morale and lots of supplies, 
the battle waged in the CBI Theater by the 22nd Bomb Squadron was 
somewhat different. Either bad weather, no gasoline, no bombs, or no 
ammunition meant no combat missions. In the meantime, the combat crews 
were prepared to fly and fight; when unable to, their morale began to slump.
The Death of President Roosevelt 
On April 13, 1945, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt died. Aside 
from the shock of the event itself, war-related concerns dominated 
conversations everywhere in the CBI Theater. How would the president’s 
demise affect the current war, the future hope for peace, and conditions at 
home? The flag flown at half-mast served as a daily reminder of the nation’s
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loss. In office since 1932, Roosevelt had been in office so long that most of the 
squadron could not remember another President. The belated air-mail editions 
of Time and Newsweek in this time of grief were additional reminders of their 
isolation and their slim contact with the United States and the war throughout 
the rest of the world.38
The War Winds Down 
Although the war in the CBI Theater had not yet ended, victory in 
Europe, V-E Day, following Germany’s unconditional surrender was great 
news. The celebration was cut short, however, because the 22nd Bomb 
Squadron flew another mission the next day. The day after that, the squadron 
was jolted once again into the reality of war with fifteen airplanes on a 
coordinated medium altitude attack on Pao Ching, China. One of these planes 
was hit directly in the pilot’s cock-pit, crashed, and exploded on the west side 
of the Tzu Kiang River directly across from Pao Ching. The battle in China 
was definitely not over yet.
The squadron was to celebrate its third anniversary overseas in May, but 
orders from higher headquarters postponed the celebration because of an 
important mission the next day. Even though only five missions flew that
38 Historical Research Agency (Hq USAF HRC), 341st Bomb Group 
1941 - 1945 Documents. (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL), 1945 Files.
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month, costly losses included two aircraft and thirteen combat crew 
members.39 By 27 June, the squadron was able to observe its third 
anniversary overseas in spite of inclement weather.
Administratively, the Bombing Bulldogs were, for the most part, 
functioning well. The squadron Supply and Maintenance departments were 
operating smoothly except for shortages in supply items and parts needed for 
maintenance all over China. Of the B-25s, 92 percent were in commission 
throughout the month of June. In addition, communications on base and in the 
air were excellent; however, the telephone and teletype lines to Kunming were 
often down. At the same time, much to everyone’s surprise, the old reliable B- 
25 Mitchell was to be replaced by its more modem counterpart, the A-26 
Invader. As a result, a large number of the combat personnel were expected to 
be sent to Fenni, India, for four weeks of transition training, and the squadron 
looked forward to a superior combat plane which might hasten the end of the 
war.
The 22nd Bomb Squadron Changes 
The real surprise in July 1945 was that the Fourteenth Air Force 
Commander, Maj Gen. Claire Chennault, had resigned and returned to the 
United States. That month also marked the beginning of the 22nd Bomb 
Squadron as a B-25 (M) squadron. (See Appendix H for diagrams of B-25s
39 Ibid., 1945 Files.
and A-26s.) Almost immediately, it became an A-26 Light/Attack (L)40 
fighter-bomber squadron scheduled to move from Yangkai to bases somewhere 
on the coast of China, probably Foochow which could be used as a staging 
area. The goal was for the A-26s to make direct attack flights to mainland 
Japan. Although the Japanese Emperor clearly believed that the Japanese 
military was invincible, reality demonstrated poundings by B-29s on Tokyo, 
Nagoya, Osaka, and Kobe. In fact, Nagoya was hit again with a ten-day fire 
blitz that destroyed over thirty-one square miles. As a result, the Japanese 
were relying on the wholesale use of kamikaze or suicide attacks against 
assaulting fleets because the only remaining pilots were inadequately trained 
replacements who were no match for the United States crews. The United 
States air offensive on Japan destroyed sixty-six cities, counting the two hit by 
atom bombs, and burned out 178 square miles before the Emperor decided to 
surrender41
40 L  refers to light planes.
41 Craven and Cate, xviii-xx.
64
The War in Asia Ends 
The sudden and tragic end to the war on September 2, 1945, V-J Day, 
was astounding since startling scientific developments rather than direct combat 
precipitated it. As a result of the successful assault on Japan with the atom 
bomb, those with the technology--the United States, Great Britain, and 
Canada-commanded the world. At the 22nd Bomb Squadron still stationed in 
China lengthy discussions argued and speculated on the potential effects of 
atomic warpower on the future of the world.42
42 Ibid., 1945 Files.
CHAPTER 4
THE IMPORTANCE OF THE FLYING TIGERS TO THE SUCCESS 
OF THE UNITED STATES IN WORLD WAR II
The 341st Bomb Group, 69th Composite Wing,
Fourteenth Air Force, the Flying Tigers
The 341st Bomb Group, activated in India on 15 September 1942, 
battled against heavy odds in the CBI Theater. The Japanese, for example, 
had cut off the Burma Road by conquering the greater part of Burma and were 
threatening to move into India. The job of supplying American units in China 
had to be accomplished by transport planes flying from India over the 18,000 
foot Himalayas; therefore, few pilots and planes were available to the Chinese 
and Indians.
From September through the end of 1942, the 341st Bomb Group was 
not yet in suitable condition to commence operations from bases in India 
against the Japanese in Burma. Comprised of the 11th and 22nd Bomb 
Squadrons which had been assigned to the 7th Bombardment Group (H) and 
the 490th and 491st Bomb Squadrons, which were new, the only combat ready 
unit was the 11th Bomb Squadron operating under the China Air Task Force 
(CATF) in Kunming, China. The other three squadrons as well as the 341st
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Group Headquarters were at Karachi, India. Three months later, with 
additional equipment and personnel, all but the 11th Bomb Squadron, which 
was stationed in China, moved from Karachi on the west coast of India across 
the continent to Chakulia and Ondal near Calcutta. The B-25s prepared to 
strike against targets in central Burma from there.1
The B-25s of the 341st Bomb'Group, using the bases at Chakulia and 
Ondal as lay-back bases and Argatala as the forward staging field, struck at 
bridges, locomotives, railroad yards, trackage, and rolling stock in the Moneya- 
Mandalay-Gokteik region in central Burma; and they ranged as far north as 
Myitkyina and as far south as Thazi. The main objective of these bombing 
attacks was to delay the movement of supplies from southern Burma to the 
Japanese troops fighting in northern Burma.
The bombing of the Myitnge. Bridge illustrated the difficulties 
encountered by the 341st Bomb Group. The bridge, ten miles south of 
Mandalay, was situated just above the junction of the only two rail lines 
running from southern Burma. A most vital link in the 2,060 miles of rail lines 
in Burma, the Myitnge Bridge was a four-span, single-track, steel structure 610 
feet long. On 1 January 1943, six B-25s loaded with 500 pound bombs struck at 
the bridge and scored four hits on the north and south approaches and three 
on the southern span. Nine days later the Mitchells repeated their effort, but
___________________________
1 Historical Research Agency. (Hq USAF HRC) 341st Bomb Group 1942- 
1945 Documents-Copies on File. Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 7-20 July 1994.
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they were not successful; B-24s of another group, on the other hand, caused 
extensive damage. The job of the 341st was to discourage the Japanese as they 
attempted to repair the bridge. On 16 January 1943, five B-25s bombed the 
bridge with 500 pounders destroying the southern approach which temporarily 
suspended renovations. This scenario repeated itself many times during the 
year.2
This cyclical bridge-busting process discouraged the B-25 pilots and 
crews. In addition, an enormous tonnage of bombs was expended with 
comparatively small results. Several causes contributed to this bombing 
ineffectiveness. First, the bridges were constructed so that only a direct hit 
with a properly-fused, general-purpose bomb inflicted serious damage. Any 
delay in detonation would allow the bomb to pass through the super-structure 
of the bridge and fall harmlessly into the water beneath. Second, the B-25s 
often bombed at high altitudes. A reliable delayed-action fuse was necessary 
for low-altitude bombing as well as adequate fighter protection.3
Squadron Relocation 
Towards the end of 1943, the 22nd and 491st Bomb Squadrons and the 
341st GHQ joined the 11th Squadron at Yangkai, China. Only the 490th 
Squadron was left behind to carry on the fight against the Japanese in Burma.
2 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
3 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
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Because of the difficulty in blowing up bridges, the Allied ground forces had 
made little progress in driving the Japanese out of Burma even as late as the 
summer of 1944.
On 1 January 1944, Maj. Robert A. Erdin accidentally discovered the 
trick for destroying bridges while piloting a B-25 at tree-top level the Mu 
River Bridge. A large tree loomed up dead ahead, and he quickly flew his 
plane upwards to avoid the tree. By the time he brought the plane to the 
previous attack level, he was over the target. Cursing his bad luck and 
believing the tree had ruined the approach, he ordered the bombs to be 
dumped. The crew looked back expecting to see how much the bombs missed 
the target. Much to their amazement, two spans of the bridge toppled into the 
river. This chance discovery combined with added refinements became known 
as Glip bombing, a combination of glide and skip, and fostered success in 
wrecking bridges which, in turn, destroyed enemy supply lines.4 (See Appendix 
I, Distinguished Unit Citation)
As a result of Erdin’s discovery, the Allied offensive against Japan began 
during the summer of 1944. The American, British, Indian, and Chinese forces 
advanced down the Hukawng Valley of northern Burma besieged Myitkyina.
The B-25s of the 490th Squadron provided low-level air support by strafing and 
bombing troop concentrations as well as by striking at the bridges leading into
4 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
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Myitkyina. The Japanese were in retreat when Myitkyina fell in August 1944. 
The 490th then also bombed Indaw, Katha, Bhamo, and Lashio. By April 
1945, Mandalay had been taken, and Rangoon was captured shortly thereafter. 
After successful completion in Burma, the 490th Bomb Squadron joined the 
341st Group in Yangkai, China.
Administrative and Leadership Mode of the Flying Tigers
Management of the 11th Bomb Squadron 
The 11th Bomb Squadron, flying out of Kunming, China, since 
September 1942, in many ways established the pattern of operational activity 
which was followed by the 341st Group after their arrival in China in January 
1944. For example, the 11th Bomb Squadron had remained on the ground 
from 15-25 September 1942 because of bad weather and lack of maintenance 
of the planes. On 25 September, four B-25s, escorted by ten P-40s, set out to 
drop their bombs on the Gialam airdrome in Hanoi, west of Haiphong. The 
formation was attacked immediately by Japanese twin-engine fighters. To 
avoid them, the P-40s had maneuvered into the sun and dived upon the enemy 
fighters destroying nine planes.
The 11th Bomb Squadron had emphasized certain types of targets and 
strategies which were then adopted by the 341st Group. These targets included 
coastal shipping, raids on ports or harbor installations, and visual sea sweeps up 
and down coastal waters. One strategy consisted of working in pairs and flying
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parallel courses within sight of each other. Upon sight of an enemy vessel, one 
B-25 swept down with machine guns to knock out the anti-aircraft, then the 
other B-25 did the bombing. They would then exchange roles on the next 
attack. Another strategy was for the B-25s to conduct sea searches at 400 to 
500 feet and make bomb runs from there. In this way, they were able to 
operate from bases at Kweilin, Suichwan, Kanchow, and Nanking where they 
covered the Gulf of Tonkin, the Formosa Straits, and a one-hundred-mile 
extension into the South China Sea.
The coastal attacks were particularly important as the shipping routes 
from Japan went either from Shanghai south and east down the China coast or 
from Japan to Formosa and then east along the coast of China. The China 
coastal route was more practical, so the Japanese chose this most of the time.
By interfering successfully with the flow of Japanese shipping, the B-25s were 
able to deprive Japan of oil from the East Indies, rubber and tin from Malaya, 
bauxite from Indo-China, tungsten from China, and iron ore from Hainan 
Island. Therefore, the number one priority of the 341st Bomb Group was to 
augment the attacks on shipping routes throughout 1943 and 1944.
Supplementing raids on shipping were the interdiction operations 
performed on the inland rivers and waterways in China in 1944 and 1945, when 
the Japanese launched their tremendous offensives across China. The B-25s,
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alone or in pairs, attacked river craft with demolition, fragmentation, and 
incendiary bombs or strafed them with machine guns.5
The Japanese offensive prevented the Fourteenth Air Force from 
destroying its east and south China airfields at Hengyang, Lingling, Kweilin, 
Liuchow, and Nanking. In defense, the B-25s bombed and strafed river traffic, 
troop concentrations, airfields, railroads, bridges, and industrial centers. This 
activity was, however, unsuccessful. By the end of 1944, the Japanese had 
connected with French Indo-China, and the Allies were forced to face the 
dismal fact that victories in Burma had been more than offset by the 
resounding defeat in China.6
Chinese land forces achieved certain victories during the summer of 
1945; nevertheless, the war against the Japanese was destined to be decided 
outside the CBI theater of operations. The B-29s flying from the Mariana 
Islands, in particular, played the most decisive role during the last months of 
the war by dropping atomic blasts on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. When the war 
ended in August 1945, preparations were made to move the 341st Bomb Group 
to the United States in September. On 1 November 1945, the 341st Bomb 
Group arrived at Camp Kilmer, New Jersey, and was inactivated on the 
following day.
5 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
6 Ibid., 341st 1942-1945 Files.
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Table 3
Summary of the History of the 341st Bomb Group
Activity Who/What/Where Date
Constituted — 14 August 1942
Activated Karachi, India 15 September 1942
Inactivated Camp Kilmer, New Jersey 2 November 1945
Assignments Tenth Air Force 15 September 1942
India Air Task Force 3 October 1942
Fourteenth Air Force December 1943
New York Port of Embarkation 1 - 2  November 1945
Stations Camp Malir, Karachi, India 15 September - 30 December 
1942
Chakulia, India 30 December 1942 - June 1943
Kurmitola, India June 1943 - January 1944
Kunming, China January - December 1944
Yankai, China December 1944 - September 
1945
Aboard C. H. Muir 4 October - 1 November 1945
- Camp Kilmer, New Jersey 1 - 2  November 1945
Commanding Col. Torgils G. Wold
Officers
Lt. Col. James A. Philpott
Col. Morris F. Taber
Maj. Loren S. Nickels
Col. Joseph B. Wells
Col. Donald L. Clark
Col. James W. Newsome
Battle Honors India-Burma
China Defensive
China Offensive
Distinguished 
Unit Citations
For Action over French Indo-China 11 December 1944 - 12 March 
1945
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69th Composite Wing 
The 69th Composite Wing was constituted as the 69th Bombardment 
Wing on 9 August 1943, activated in China on 3 September 1943, assigned to 
the Fourteenth Air Force, and redesignated the 69th Composite Wing in 
December 1943. The Wing served in combat from December 1943 until 
August 1945, was then assigned to the Tenth Air Force in August 1945, and 
engaged in transport operations after Victory in Japan (V-J) Day. The Wing 
was awarded the Distinguished Unit Citation (DUC) for the period 1 -30 
September 1945, when the wing ferried troops and supplies in China, helped to 
evacuate prisoners of war, and flew many mercy and other special missions to 
areas in China, French Indo-China, and Manchuria. The Wing was inactivated 
in China on 26 December 1945.
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Table 4
Summary of the History of the 69th Composite Wing
Activity Who/What/Where Date
Constituted — 9 August 1943
Activated China 3 September 1943
Inactivated China 26 December 1945
Groups 51st Fighter 1943 - 1945
341st Bomb Group 1943 - 1945
Stations Kunming, China 3 September 1943
Tsuyung, China 12 January 1944
Kunming, China April 1944 - December 26, 
1945
Commanding
Officers
Brig. Gen. John C. Kennedy 23 December 1943
Col. Charles H. Anderson 1 September 1945
Maj. James F. Rhodes 15 November 1945
Campaigns India-Burma
China Defensive
China Offensive
Distinguished 
Unit Citations
China, French Indo-China, Manchuria 1 - 30 September 1945
Fourteenth Air Force, The Flying Tigers
Background
A gradual build-up of air strength occurred in the CBI Theater even 
before the creation of the Fourteenth Air Force. The American Volunteer 
Group (AVG), an organization of American volunteer fighters, had gone to 
China during the summer of 1941 to defend the Burma Road, China’s last 
remaining avenue of communication with the outside world. The AVG was
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discontinued in July 1942 and replaced by the China Air Task Force (CATF) of 
the Tenth Air Force, which absorbed many people and most of the resources of 
the AVG. This task force relied heavily upon the 23rd Fighter Group and the 
11th Bombardment Squadron (M) for its hit-and-run guerilla war against the 
Japanese. The insignia of the Fourteenth Air Force and its history as well as 
the chit worn on the jackets of the Flying Tigers who flew combat are located in 
Appendix J.
The Arrival of the Fourteenth Air Force 
When expansion of the small CATF became possible in the spring of 
1943, the Fourteenth Air Force was activated at Kunming, China, absorbing all 
CATF resources. The 308th Bombardment Group (H), equipped with B-24s, 
moved to China and joined the 23rd Fighter Group which had three squadrons 
of its own and another in attached status, all flying P-40s; Flight A of the 9th 
Photographic Squadron (L) equipped with P-43s; and the 11th Bombardment 
Squadron (flying B-25s). From this meager organizational base, the Fourteenth 
Air Force expanded during the remainder of 1943 and 1944, carrying the war 
more directly to the Japanese as supplies permitted, since the air units 
depended entirely upon an aerial supply line from India for all of their material 
resources.7
7 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
The 402nd Bombardment Group (M) and the 476th Fighter Group 
became part of the Fourteenth on 19 May 1943, but neither group had any 
squadrons, so neither became operational. As a result, both were inactivated 
on 31 July 1943. Instead, the 51st Fighter Group moved to China in October 
1943, with three squadrons of P-40s and one P-38 squadron under its control. 
That same month, some of the fighter squadrons of the Chinese American 
Composite Wing (CACW) (Provisional), which formed and trained in India, 
arrived with P-40 and B-25 aircraft. Two wings, the 68th Fighter and 69th 
Bombardment, had been activated on 3 September and 23 December 1943, 
respectively. These wings, now redesignated as Composite wings, became 
operational. The 68th Wing took control of the 23d Fighter Group, 11th 
Bombardment Squadron, and bomber and fighter elements of the CACW, 
while the 69th Wing assumed control of the 51st Fighter Group and, when it 
arrived in China in January 1944, of the 341st Bombardment Group (M), 
whose squadrons flew B-25s.
Completing the Fourteenth Air Force, the 33rd Fighter Group arrived in 
China with P-38, P-40, and P-47 aircraft during March - April 1944 and joined 
the new 312th Fighter Wing. In May 1944, the 81st Fighter Group arrived with 
P-38, P-39 and P-40 aircraft, also joining the 312th Wing. In August 1944, the 
311th Fighter Group arrived with A-36 and P-51 aircraft, joining the 312th 
Wing, and in August and September, the 33rd Fighter Group returned to India. 
Meanwhile, the CACW’S 1st Bombardment Group (M) (Provisional) and 3rd
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and 5th Fighter Groups (Provisional) had continued sending squadrons to 
China, and all were engaged in combat with the arrival of the last CACW 
squadron, the 3rd Bombardment, in September. Still other combat units 
including liaison, photo reconnaissance, tactical reconnaissance, troop carrier, 
combat cargo, and night fighter squadrons arrived piecemeal to augment the 
combat capability of the Fourteenth Air Force. Some of these units were 
assigned directly to the Fourteenth, while others were placed under the various 
wings or groups for control.
Once the Fourteenth was formed and free of Tenth Air Force control, 
Brigadier General Chennault initiated a long-range plan which required the 
establishment of staggered arcs of air bases, each probing farther into 
enemy-held eastern China. The first arc was made up of a string of bases 
running in a northeast - southwest line starting with Hengyang, followed by 
Lingling, Kweilin, Liuchow, and Nanking. Kweilin served as the hub from 
which all plans originated.
In time, Chennault further expanded his original line of forward air 
bases and established a more probing line from Tanchuk through Namyung, 
Suicheng, Kanchow, Suichwan, and Kian. This second line of attack would put 
his bombers within easy reach of the lush shipping targets off the east coast of 
China. Even beyond this line, Chennault proposed to operate his air force 
from advance bases at Nanchang, Kienow, and Changting, from which Japanese
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targets as far north as Manchuria and as far east as the Japanese islands could 
be hit.
As the Fourteenth gained strength, it threw its weight into two savage 
air campaigns to deter enemy drives from the Hankow sector on the Yangtze 
River. After the enemy withdrew, the Fourteenth consolidated its position and 
launched the CACW with American and Chinese crews flying together, built 
additional bases in eastern China, and struck at enemy-held ports on China’s 
east coast and at the enemy’s coastal shipping lines. On 1 May 1943, the 
forward echelon of the Fourteenth Air Force moved into eastern China along 
the Hengyang-Kweilin line. This brought American planes well within range of 
all major Japanese-controlled bases from northern China to French Indo- 
China and Thailand. At the same time, this tactic made Japanese shipping in 
the China Sea doubly vulnerable to air attacks. Also in May, B-24s of the 
308th Group delivered a severe blow to enemy shipping when they began 
sowing mines in the Yangtze River and the harbors of Canton, Hong Kong, 
Haiphong, Hankow, Shanghai, and Kakao on the island of Formosa. In 
September 1943, the Fourteenth began skip-bombing Japanese cargo vessels in 
the South China Sea and the Formosa Strait. By the end of 1943, such 
low-level attacks had sunk 125,000 tons of shipping in that area.
During the last three months of 1943, the full power of the Fourteenth 
Air Force was engaged against some 60,000 Japanese troops who carried on an 
offensive in the area of Changteh and Changsha. Coupled with stubborn
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resistance of Chinese ground forces, the Fourteenth succeeded in driving the 
enemy back to Yangtze River bases with a loss to the Japanese of about 20,000 
troops. Also, from 25 November to 6 December, combined attacks by the 
Fourteenth and Tenth Air Forces and the Royal Air Force were made against 
Rangoon, Burma, aimed at neutralizing that important enemy-held port and its 
rail facilities which the Japanese needed to oppose General Stilwell’s Chinese- 
American Task Force invasion of northern Burma from Ledo.
By early 1944, the Japanese controlled three strategic positions: the 
bend of the Yellow River, the bulge of the Yangtze River, and the Hong 
Kong-Canton area. During February and March, the enemy set in motion a 
program of supply accumulation and troop reinforcement in these three base 
areas in preparation for a major campaign in eastern China. The major 
offensive began in April 1944, with the Fourteenth Air Force opposed by a 
numerically superior Japanese Air Force operating from large, fully supplied, 
and powerfully supported bases.
From about 22 June 1944 to 30 January 1945, the Fourteenth suffered 
numerous set-backs as the enemy captured base after base. Falling to the 
enemy were bases at Kengyang, Ungling, Kweilin, Luichow, Paoching, Tanchuk, 
Nanking, Tushan, Suichwan, Namyung, Sincheng, Nankang, and Kanchow. In 
fact, it was only the tactical support furnished by the Fourteenth that prevented 
the total collapse of the semi-trained Chinese armies. Pilots of the Fourteenth
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fought bravely, establishing a combat ratio of 7.7 enemy aircraft destroyed for 
every American plane lost.
One outstanding achievement of the Fourteenth Air Force during these 
crucial months began in the spring of 1944 occurred when a handful of 
specially equipped B-24 Liberators began all-out attacks against Japanese 
shipping in the Formosa Strait and the South China Sea. Each B-24 averaged 
about 800 tons of shipping sunk per combat sortie. This attrition placed a 
tremendous burden on the Japanese lines of supply to the Southwest Pacific 
and on Japan’s dwindling merchant fleet as a whole. During 1944, the total 
claims of the Fourteenth Air Force against Japanese shipping were 640,900 
tons sunk, 237,050 tons probably sunk, and 396,950 tons damaged. At the same 
time, in aerial combat, American pilots destroyed 494 enemy planes, while 
losing only 64. The enemy also lost 33,450 troops that year.8
January 1945 was the last month during which the Fourteenth was 
opposed by large numbers of enemy aircraft, and they were able to destroy 211 
enemy planes that month. After January, only 98 enemy planes could be 
claimed as destroyed; none after June 1945. This attainment of air superiority 
was assisted in some sense by the opening of the Stilwell Road into China in 
January and the completion of a pipeline to Kunming, although most supplies 
still had to be ferried across the Hump from India.
8 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
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By spring 1945, the South China Sea and Indo-China coasts came within 
economical range of newly established bases in the Philippines, and the Fifth 
and Seventh Air Forces began attacking targets there. This made it possible 
for the Fourteenth to concentrate increasingly on inland targets of importance, 
especially on the Japanese communications corridor in China which ran north 
and south between Hankow and Hengyang. At the same time, the Fourteenth 
also continued its support of Chinese ground forces, particularly during the 
Japanese drives of March 1945 toward Hsian and Ankang and later toward 
Chihkiang. The Americans relentlessly attacked Japanese troops and positions 
which prevented them from capitalizing on their ground superiority. By the 
time the enemy surrendered their Greater East Asia corridor and withdrew 
from southern China in May 1945, they found their mobility and supply lines 
critically reduced by the attacks of the Fourteenth Air Force.9
Effective 22 June 1945, the XIV Air Force Tactical Air Command 
(Provisional) was formed, controlling the 68th and 69th Composite Wings. On 
9 July, the XIV Air Force Strategic Air Command (Provisional) was formed to 
control the 312th Fighter Wing and Chinese American Composite Wing. 
Meanwhile, the Tenth Air Force completed its combat operations in India and 
Burma and on 23 July and moved to Kunming. One week later, the 
Fourteenth moved from Kunming to Peishiyi. On 1 August 1945, the Tenth
9 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
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Air Force assumed operational control over XIV Air Force Tactical Air 
Command and the 68th and 69th Composite Wings, while Fourteenth used the 
XIV Air Force Strategic Air Command for its portion of China. These 
arrangements were short-lived, however, for the Japanese soon surrendered.
On 25 August, some organizational reshuffling took place, and the Fourteenth 
again acquired most of the combat units which had temporarily been allocated 
to the Tenth Air Force.
From 25 August to the end of 1945, both the Tenth and Fourteenth Air 
Forces remained in China. They disposed of their subsidiary organizations 
through inactivation or by returning the units to the United States for disposal. 
The headquarters along with a number of organizations comprising the 
Fourteenth left China in December 1945 and were transported to Fort Lawton, 
Washington, where they were inactivated during the early weeks of 1946.10
May 1945
Germany unconditionally surrendered on V-E Day (Victory in Europe), 
May 8, 1945. Preliminary announcement among the Flying Tigers stole some 
thunder from the official announcement; nevertheless, the Chinese Nectar of 
the Gods flowed freely and even the heavenly aroma of stateside rye or 
bourbon came from an occasional bottle hoarded for the celebration. The next
10 Ibid., 14th 1942-1945 Files.
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day was sobering, however, when they flew their first mission of the month, a 
gentle reminder that the war in China was not over.
The squadron was even more severely jolted into reality the next day 
when fifteen of their planes took part in a coordinated attack with three 
squadrons of the 341st Bomb Group. The target was Paoching, China, a 
principal Japanese supply point in Hunan Province. Immediately after 
dropping its bombs, Plane 421 sustained a direct hit somewhere near the cock­
pit and top turret which were in flames. The plane never recovered from a 
sudden 45-degree dive, and it crashed and exploded on the west side of the Tzu 
Kiang River directly across from the town. The Battle of China was not yet 
over.
At the end of the month, a sudden burst of activity was highlighted by a 
successful night mission in which twelve planes played havoc with Japanese 
transportation facilities in French Indo-China. This was the Squadron’s first 
all-night mission in about a year, and happily, all planes and their crews 
returned safely. The Squadron was just beginning to breathe more easily when 
two crews were briefed to follow-up the all-night mission. The first plane 
experienced difficulty retracting its landing gears immediately after take-off 
because of a break in the hydraulic system. Eventually, it landed safely.
Because the first plane could not continue, three efforts were made from the 
tower to call Lieutenant Wirth, who commanded the second plane, back to the 
field. Apparently he did not receive the messages, and the plane was not seen
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or heard from again, though all airfields and fighter control stations were 
carefully checked. The personnel on board were reported Missing in Action.
June 1945
After nearly two years, the Squadron learned through his letter to them 
that T/Sgt. John W. Boyd was alive. In August 1943, when the 22nd was based 
at Chakulia, India, his plane had been shot down while making a low level 
attack on Meiktila Dam. Only Sergeant Boyd and the engineer-gunner, S/Sgt 
John E. Leisure, were able to leave the plane quickly. Because their chutes did 
not open until they had almost reached the ground, they were severely injured. 
As a result, they were captured by the Japanese and imprisoned at Rangoon. 
Leisure died of malnutrition; Boyd, on the other hand, survived the liberation 
of Rangoon and was freed.
On 3 June, all sixteen of the B-25s took part in an attack by the entire 
341st Bomb Group on Liuchow (24°18’N-109°16’E) in support of the Chinese 
offensive on the city. The Squadron planes staged out of Luliang, China, in 
three flights. Major Berryman led Flight A; Lieutenant Eck, Flight B; Captain 
Kroeger, Flight C, with Lieutenant Schofield as the other pilot. The planes 
made a successful rendezvous with ten fighters from the 23rd Fighter Group 
made up of P-51s and P-38s over Ishan at 1325 hours at 10,000 feet. A  and B  
Flights were over the target at 1338 Hours; C Flight, 1353 hours. The entire 
bomb load of the planes, 161 N-l and A-l demos, 18 M-17 incendiaries, and 24
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M-18 incendiaries (M-18), were dropped precisely onto the target area assigned 
on the south and east side of the river in Liuchow. At least two secondary 
explosions were observed and several fires, resembling oil or gasoline fires, 
swelled with black smoke. The combination of smoke and clouds obscured 
accurate assessment of the number of buildings destroyed.
Major F. M. Sibley 
During June, the executive officer who embodied the 22nd, Major F. M. 
Sibley, ended his tour of duty. The squadron had been led by five commanding 
officers, and the personnel had so changed that only Major Sibley and three 
other men recalled the squadron’s India activities. The major had been 
commissioned a first lieutenant on 22 June 1942, and served in an 
administrative capacity for three months at Santa Ana Army Air Base.
Typically, Sib wanted no more of that stuff and left the United States for 
overseas at his own request on 7 October 1942. On 1 December 1942, he was 
assigned to the 22nd Bomb Squadron in Karachi, India, as Mess Officer and 
Adjutant. On 22 September 1943, having been promoted to Captain fourteen 
days before, Sibley was transferred to the 341st Bomb Group as the Adjutant.
In the middle of November, he returned to the 22nd to begin the eighteen 
more months of uninterrupted service to the squadron which ended with his 
rotation to the United States in June 1945. During his period at the 22nd, he 
was Assistant S-2 Officer, S-2 Officer for six months, and Executive Officer
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beginning 1 July 1944. He became a major on 1 October 1944, after earning 
five overseas bars, the Asiatic-Pacific ribbon, and two bronze stars for the 
India-Burma and China campaigns. (Refer to Appendix K for the Foreword to 
the History of 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers)
CHAPTER 5
A COMPARISON OF THE MANAGEMENT AND LEADERSHIP 
OF THE FLYING TIGERS AND EDUCATION
Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this study, Flying Tigers' 22nd Bomb Squadron 1942 - 
1945: A n  Analysis o f Management and Leadership Practices, was to examine a 
series of phenomena related to both military leadership and educational 
administration. This investigation looked at the interrelationships, definitions, 
and applications of war, education, administration, leadership, and power.
This study is unique because of the background of the investigator. This 
researcher, who later became an educator, was a fighter-bomber pilot as a 
member of the Flying Tigers. Consequently, the methodology used included 
historical, observational, and retrospective components. Historical research 
encompassed all available documents pertaining to the Flying Tigers as well as 
first-hand accounts from surviving members of the squadron. The 
observational aspects of the research were ex post facto in nature, an advantage 
in this case because the investigator had no impact on the behavior of the 
participants. Effectively, then, this is a case study of the Flying Tigers including
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their development, their activities during World War II, and their 
organizational behavior. Information gained from the research was then 
applied to the experience of the researcher, an educator with nearly fifty years 
of experience.
Drawing on observations and historical investigation, the following 
research questions were posed:
1. How did The Flying Tigers come to be?
2. What was the importance of The Flying Tigers to the success of the 
United States in World War II?
3. What was the administrative and leadership mode of The Flying 
Tigers'!
a. Was the mode appropriate for the military?
b. Was the mode appropriate for the time?
4. How does wartime combat compare to the educational environment 
today?
5. How does the administrative and leadership mode of The Flying 
Tigers apply to today’s educational scene?
This chapter addresses the last question about the application of the research 
to the current educational environment.
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The Application of This Research to Current Education
In considering the twenty-first century, futurists John Naisbitt and
Patricia Aburdene remarked, "The dominant principle of organization has
shifted, from management in order to control an enterprise to leadership in
order to bring out the best in people and to respond quickly to change."1
Leadership in any environment differs from management or administration in
that it is neither coercive nor necessarily hierarchical. Current school
administration has, as one of its primary current goals, justification of the entire
enterprise called public education. Therefore, the typical concentration of
administrators is constantly political and economic rather than educational.
Successful and effective leadership are not the same. For example,
every task-oriented group basically needs to achieve its goals and to maintain
itself. If these two goals are accomplished, then leadership has been successful.
Further, if no cost of that success has impeded reaching the group’s goal, then
the leadership has also been effective. According to Owens,
When one attempts to lead and the intended behaviors are in fact 
elicited from members of the group, we speak of successful leadership. 
However, although successful leadership may produce the intended 
behaviors in the group, it does not necessarily follow that they actually 
help the group either to achieve its tasks or to strengthen itself as a 
group. One could, for example, try to improve the effectiveness of a 
group by emphasizing orderly standard operating procedures. A leader 
who was able to get these procedures developed and installed so that
1 John Naisbitt and Patricia Aburdene, Megatrends 2000: Ten New 
Directions for the 1990’s (New York: William Morrow and Company, Inc., 
1990), 218.
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people implemented them could be described as successful. If, however, 
the processes of establishing the new procedures produced a great deal 
of dissatisfaction among members of the group and-in the end-the 
organization did not seem to be any more effective in achieving its 
goals, then the leadership could hardly be termed effective.2
In a school, for example, a principal may try to initiate a new program and do
so successfully. If, however, the teachers and students become rebellious and
uncooperative as a result, then the leadership has not been effective.
While leadership may not be a hierarchical activity, the maximum
capacity must be obtained from every individual without precipitating
disorganization. After acceptance of goals by the entire group, it is critical to
engage the creativity of all those involved in solving the problem. This applies
in both educational and military environments. For example, every member of
the Flying Tigers was engaged in site-based management whenever engaged in a
mission. With certain guidelines and operational procedures as standard, the
pilot as leader and the crew were totally responsible for the success or failure
of the mission. The more urgent the problem, the more important for the
group leader to encourage, support, affirm, and reward risk-taking behavior.
During World War II, the upper management in the military had limited
understanding of air power and air combat. As a result, lower level leaders
lacked a resource for advice and consultation. At the same time, the power
structure had problems of defending budget, obtaining supplies, and explaining
2 Owens, p. 158.
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circumstances they faced in Asia. Theoretical models had not been established 
for the situations that pertained; therefore, the on-site staff were stuck in 
irrelevant theory that did not apply to war combat.
The creation of community is important in both military and educational 
environments especially in situations where objectives are complex. Arguably, 
the objective in the CBI Theater in World War II was simple: destroy the 
Japanese and prevent them from conquering China, Burma, and India. In 
reality, the task, as has already been demonstrated, was much more 
complicated. For example, traversing the Hump required a specific maneuver 
in order to transport supplies from India to China. A new tactic, in another 
case, had to be developed to blow up bridges. Leaders encouraged and 
supported their group members in risk-taking; therefore, they did not hesitate 
to try new ideas for fighting the Japanese. Variation can turn into 
achievement.
Bonds are formed when groups have deprivation in common. During 
World War II, a common economy developed among troops in the CBI 
Theater. Despite life-threatening challenges, the mission of victory could not 
be compromised. This goal presses individuals to find in themselves strengths 
and resources that might otherwise go untapped. This is the essential challenge 
of leadership.
Organization, especially in 1943, was an issue for the Flying Tigers. 
Although they did not know of or relate to the administrative and leadership
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concerns of the upper echelons, squadron members remained committed on a 
daily basis to their objectives. They did not require external direction because 
their strategic objective was clear. The leadership demonstrated within the 
341st Bomb Group and 22nd Bomb Squadron exhibited, as Warren Bennis has 
found, management of attention, management of meaning, and management of 
trust, for the squadron members clearly understood the goal and trusted their 
leaders.3
Implications of the Research 
Leadership
Military officers and educational administrators are often placed in 
situations which require instantaneous decision-making. The quality of these 
decisions determines their later characterization as either a manager, an 
administrator, a bureaucrat, or a leader. For example, in the CBI Theater, 
Captain Williams and his crew left on a mission, but their engine was hit by 
anti-aircraft fire and began to smoke. Unable to continue the mission while 
debilitated, Captain Williams decided to return to base. While circling, he 
learned that several other fighters were low on fuel and needed to land 
immediately. He decided to wait as long as he could to let those fighters land. 
While in queue, his wing started to flame, and he gave the order to bail out, 
which the men did. As a result of this decision, all but one of the men
3 Ibid.
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survived. In fact, the only crew member killed lost his life because he had not 
followed the instruction to keep his parachute with him at all times. In 
summary, Captain Williams’ decision to let the other fighters land first enabled 
all their crews and his own to survive. Consequently, he demonstrated 
leadership rather than simply command.
This exemplifies situational leadership in which the power of the 
leader’s position combines with the degree of structure of the task and the 
quality of the relations between the leaders and the followers.4 Captain 
Williams demonstrated a style of leadership which was appropriate to the 
situation at a time when he might otherwise have exhibited one of McCall and 
Lombardo’s fatal flaws-he may have been both unable to think strategically 
and incapable of acting sensitively to the needs of the other planes.5 He 
demonstrated all three skill areas required for effective leadership in given 
situations: situation sensitivity, situational management, and style flexibility.6
Administration vs. Leadership 
Differences exist, however, between leadership and administration.
While both require decision-making, administration more than leadership is 
concerned with the issue of control. This is evident in schools in the form of
4 Owens, 162.
5 Hersey and Blanchard, 99.
6 Owens, 180.
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crowd control and avoidance of litigation. For example, before a recent local 
high school graduation, the principal warned the students that throwing of 
mortarboards was unacceptable because of potential injury. Any student, he 
said, observed tossing his or her hat in the air, regardless of the amount of 
exuberance, would forfeit his or her diploma. In their excitement, several 
students launched their hats and lost their diplomas as punishment. This 
exemplifies administration, not leadership.
Sometimes a fine line can be drawn between administration and 
leadership. An administrator is defined by role and power; a leader is " . . .  a 
member of the group who helps it to develop ways of interacting that facilitate 
achieving the goals that the individuals share."7 Both, however, are goal- 
oriented. As a case in point, a teacher may be a leader but is not, by 
definition, an administrator. The situation may determine the leadership of the 
group.
According to Hersey and Blanchard, leadership is "the process of
influencing the activities of an individual or a group in efforts toward goal
achievement in a given situation."8 However,
Situational theory uses only one variable to analyze the nature of the 
situation-maturity. Maturity is the capacity to set high but attainable 
goals, the willingness and ability to take responsibility, and the 
experience of an individual or group. However, maturity is a relative
7 Owens, 148.
8 Hersey and Blanchard, Management of Organizational Behavior. 94.
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concept. An individual or group is not mature or immature in any 
general sense. Rather, maturity is defined only in relation to a specific 
task. The question is not Is the individual or group mature or 
immature? but rather On this specific job or task, what is the level of 
maturity of the group or individual? . . . .  The maturity of both 
individuals and the work group determines the appropriate supervisory 
or leader behavior.9
The investigator has observed great change over time in the maturity of the
school district in which he works. The goal, historically, was simple and
attainable-educate students by teaching them the skills and knowledge needed
to function successfully in society. As the district has grown from small-town to
large metropolitan area, however, the organizational behavior has changed.
This transition is exhibited particularly by the unwillingness of most teachers
and administrators to accept responsibility for the actions of this unwieldy
monolith. The situation of the organization has changed; leadership has not.
In a school district, administration takes the form of an administrative
code and/or manuals on policy and procedure. During World War II,
administration of the Flying Tigers was determined by air doctrine, especially as
defined by AWPD/1, the primary document concerning the fighting of an air
war by the United States. As the war ensued, refinements could be observed
as each squadron interpreted, not the overall mission of defeating the enemy,
but the procedures required to accomplish this goal. Therefore, strategies
9 Wayne K. Hoy and Patrick B. Forsyth. Effective Supervision: Theory 
into Practice (New York: Random House, 1986), 135-136.
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included coastal attacks, raids on ports or harbor installations, and visual 
sweeps up and down coastal waters.
In education, however, the aim is defined as educating students, but the 
strategy to attain that goal may not be as direct as dropping a bomb on the 
enemy. It is nearly impossible, for example, to educate a hungry child or to 
force a student who has witnessed the murder of her mother by her stepfather 
to pay attention to the details of a textbook. Can a student high on drugs 
concentrate at all?
Teachers who remain idealistic and committed to the goal of educating 
students are frustated, but not daunted by these problems. This researcher has 
witnessed the success of teachers who have become leaders in extremely 
difficult or hazardous situations in their schools. For example, in a vocational- 
technical high school where this investigator has taught, the emphasis is on job 
skills training so that students earn both a high school diploma and a useful 
career upon graduation. The environment is, in and of itself, highly motivating 
for students because the means and the end are closely related. As a result, 
one would expect that teachers would not have to work hard to motivate 
students. This is not the case.
Students apparently decide the homework issue around eighth or ninth 
grade. Until that time, most students actually turn in assignments. By tenth 
grade, until last year the first grade available in the vocational-technical high 
school in this district, many students simply refuse to do homework. The
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dilemma for the teacher is that work that could previously be assigned for 
independent learning or review, especially reading, had to consume class time 
in order for students to receive content. This investigator, as a teacher in the 
vocational-technical high school which, incidentally, is not the only place with 
the homework crisis, resolved to circumvent this problem by doing all content 
in class in a variety of ways. For example, all reading was done aloud for 
history so that, at a minimum, every student had the opportunity to hear the 
content. After that, students worked in groups on answering questions and 
then the entire class participated in a discussion on the topic. Finally, an open- 
book test was given which could be answered with help from classmates. In 
other words, every student had a chance to be exposed to the information.
This exemplifies leadership in transferring content knowledge.
Implications for Future Research 
The study of history can guide the future. Synthesizing the experience 
of life may also provide direction. The unique feature in this research, 
however, was the use of two diverse situations which are related only by the 
fact that the investigator was present in both.
It is almost idiotic to comment that the world is changing. Technology, 
for example, has enabled people to communicate globally instantaneously. In 
education, however, schools still operate in a mass production mentality. 
Connection is not frequently made between real-world and academics. This
98
problem could be mitigated by conceptual blockbusting-examining two or more 
seemingly unrelated events with the goal of solving problems in one of them.
Conclusion
There is a radical-and wonderful-new idea in the air these days 
in at least some of our public conversations: the idea that every 
citizen is capable of the kind of intellectual competence 
previously attained by only a small minority of citizens.. . .  the 
notion that all children could and should be inventors of their 
own theories, critics of other people’s ideas, makers of their own 
personal marks on the world. It’s an idea with revolutionary 
implications. If we take it seriously.10
Schools today are a battlefield not terribly unlike the CBI Theater. 
Legislation, regulation, and fear of litigation have constrained many 
administrators who eagerly try to educate children. Teachers employed in 
schools, like pilots and other Air Force personnel, must be taught to do their 
jobs effectively. Similar to conditions during World War II in Asia, schools 
must do their jobs and attain their goals without supplies, adequate resources, 
or trained leadership. Further, models of leadership must come from within 
education rather than attempting to replicate models from business or the 
military.11
10 Deborah Meier. "Democracy Is Not Always Convenient." Education 
Week. 19 April 1995, 35.
11 Thomas J. Sergiovanni. "Schools Are Special Places," Education Week. 
10 May 1995, 48-49, 35.
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The militaiy during World War II brought about change in the process 
of leadership development particularly during the induction phase. It was not 
an accident that future members of the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers, 
were molded into an effective combat team. According to Hersey and 
Blanchard, all four of Schein’s elements of training are present in military 
leadership training:
• the physical removal of the individuals being changed from the 
accustomed routines, sources of information, and social relationships;
• the undermining and destruction of all social supports;
• demeaning and humiliating experience to help individuals being 
changed to see their old attitudes or behavior as unworthy and thus 
to be motivated to change;
• the consistent linking of reward with willingness to change and of 
punishment with unwillingness to change.12
This was significant for the 22nd Bomb Squadron, the Flying Tigers, because
training included being sent far from home, being removed from contact with
their relatives and friends, being subjected to subhuman treatment to become
officers and gentlemen, and often being threatened to be forced to complete
harsh duties or to lose free time. The ultimate penalty was loss of status as a
candidate for officer status.
After successful completion of training, the future leaders quickly moved 
to the changing phase, first by identifying with the Drill Instructor (DI), and
12 Hersey and Blanchard, 382.
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then by emulating informal leaders as the cadets developed into officers. The 
five percent who proved to be too slow, too fat, too dumb, or too difficult were 
dropped. The remaining cadets emerged with one passionate desire--to persist 
as cadets at all costs.13 Because of the exigency of the war waged against the 
principle of freedom, Americans allowed themselves to be subjected to this 
type of education and training. Each cadet who completed training emerged as 
a leader dedicated to the defense of freedom and the defeat of the enemy.
In 1995, the same type of will to win against the enemies of society and 
to emerge victorious currently challenges all Americans. Especially hard hit, 
educational leaders in the United States are faced daily with illegal drugs, 
raging violence, brutal crime, hopeless desolation for many of the students who 
live on the streets, abject poverty, and a host of other social problems.
American schools have become battle zones for gangs, rapes, extortion, 
immorality, muggings, weapons, and lethal substances. Relatively unheard of in 
the past, students, teachers, and administrators are beaten, battered, and even 
shot to death on a regular basis. Most recently, the most heinous threat 
concocted by American citizens who were educated in United States schools 
resulted in the fatal destruction of a government building in Oklahoma City, 
where nearly 200 people were murdered.
13 Ibid., 388.
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Education is a tool. It can be used to train leaders for war or peace. 
Schools must, as the military did in World War II, continue to be responsive to 
the situation which currently exists in the schools. We are at war. We need to 
prepare and train combatants in the skills, techniques, and art of leadership as 
the militaiy did in 1942-1945, as we educated future leaders of the 22nd Bomb 
Squadron, the Flying Tigers.
APPENDIX A 
PHOTOCOPIES OF AIRPLANES IN COMBAT
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APPENDIX E 
AWARD OF CHINESE WINGS FOR SERVICE 
IN WORLD WAR II
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•>3£SS RELEASE FOR FURTHER INFORMATION:
CBI Hump Pilots Association, Inc, 
For Local Media P. 0. Box 458
Poplar Bluff,  Missouri 63902 
(314) 785-2420
NAME JACK' SCHOFIELD________________________    YOUR PHONE (702) 582-9638______
ADDRESS l?OB South 8th  S tr e e t , Las Vegas, Nevada 89104_____
COMMENTS; B-2^ M itchell P i lo t ,  22nd Bomb Squadron, ? 4 ls t  Bomb Group, 69th Composite
Wing, 14th Air Force "Flying Tigers," China-Burma-India (OBI) Theaterf_A si& tic^Pacific-------
Combat Theater, United S ta tes  Ancv Air Pnr<»Bf i Q4P..1 oitq, World War I I_______ ____________
. . . .w as  awarded the Chinese Air Force P i lo t  Wings authorized by
General Tang Fei of the Chinese Air Force, Republic of China (Taiwan), with the coopera­
t ion of the Chinese Air Force Veterans Association. Presentations were made by 
Major General Wang Kwang-Ying, on September 1, 1994, during the Hump Pilo ts  Association's 
49th Annual Reunion in Sacramento, California.
Colonel Konsin Shah, President of the Chinese Air Force Veterans Association stated 
th a t  the Government of the  Republic of China i s  honoring these individuals. "While China 
was encircled from the coast ,  Hump Pilots  missions were the only resource th a t  could carry 
the war outward. In the 49th year of Japanese surrender, I wish to congratulate members 
of your Association fo r  a smooth and graceful reunion. We will always remember your 
•fforts  in 1943-1945, through our generation into the next generation. Without the Hump 
Lkits the Chinese Air Force and 14th Air Force could not have fought the war against the 
Japanese."
The Hump Pilots Association is composed of over 5,000 a i r  crew members and support 
personnel who were engaged in the China-Burma-India Theater of operation during WW-II. A 
major portion of the f ly ing  provided the en t i re  supplies for the American and Chinese 
Armies arid Air Forces in China—the f i r s t  time such a massive a i r l i f t  was ever attempted. 
The November 19, 1945 issue of TIME magazine reported on page 26: “Unofficial estimates
were that  3,000 Allied t ransport  and tac t ic a l  a i rc ra f t  had been lost among those jagged 
peaks (Himalaya Mountains). But for th is  price, the U. S. had backed China, and U.S. 
units  in China, with invaluable aid: 78,000 tons went over the Hump in the peak month of
July." These downed a i r c r a f t  made an "aluminum t r a i l "  over the "Hump," as the Himalayas 
were called. The t e r r i b l e  weather and rugged terra in  posed as constant a danger as the 
Japanese f ighters and bombers.
A three-volume se t  of books, CHINA AIRLIFT - THE HUMP records a f i r s t  hand "history" 
of the CBI Theater during WW-II and are available through the Association. HPA erected a 
Memorial to those who flew the "Hump" which is located at the Air Force Museum, Wright- 
Patterson Air Force Base, Dayton, Ohio. The Museum of Aviation, Warner-Robins Air Force 
•Base, Warner-Robins, Georgia, houses an extensive exhibit of the China Burma India 
Theater, and displays fo r  fu ture  generations what was accomplished by these veterans.
Receiving these wings wil l long be remembered, and is evidence tha t  the successful 
e f fo r t s  to  keep an e n t i r e  nation alive under the greatest of odds, enabling us to  achieve 
victory, has not been forgotten!
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Since 1941 an ever growing number of Ameriain men—long 
isolated from the world except by air—have braved fearful 
weather, uncharted terrain, and an enemy superior in numbers 
to help smash Japanese dreams of conquest. As members of 
the original Flying Tigers, or the tiny China Air Task Force, 
or now the famed 14th Air Force they have all been com­
manded by a man o f indomitable spirit and determination— 
General G  L. Chennault.
KUNMING, CHINA
HEADQUARTERS
14th AIR FORCE 
FLYING TIGERS”
C. L. CHENNAULT, COMMANDING GENERAL
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3 4 1 s t Bom bardm ent Group (M) 
14 th  Air Force 
China 1945
"THE BOMBING BULLDOG"
Official Insignia of the 
22nd Bombardment Sqdn. (M)
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AAF 421 (22d Bomb* Sqdn.) 19 March 1945*
SUBJECTS A ircraft Marking for the 22d Bombardment Squadron (U).
/
70s Commanding O fficer, 341st Bombardment Group (M), A.7 .0 . 212,
c /o  Postraster, New Xork City.
By authority .delegated to  the Conaanding General, ArayAir 
. Forces, by AG le t t e r  400.161 (12-7-42) OB-S-A, dated 19 Bacasfcor 1942, 
the follow ing in sig n ia  for the narking of a ircra ft of. t£e 22d Bernhard- .
. nent Squadron (!£), Army Air Forces, i s  approveds
AIRCRAFT laRKXMOs Over and through a lemon yellow d isc ,
border lig h t brcrwn, a caricatured, 
pugnacious, lig h t brown B-25 a ircra ft 
in  f lig h t , toward dexter base, wearing 
a red brown derby and a red-and-white- 
striped turtlenack sweater, having 
look of fero city  on caricatured fa ce , 
machine gun barrels, proper, issu ing  
from n o str ils , and a large brown dlger 
fire d , proper, w ith white band, held 
in  mouth, leaving white speed lin es  
and tra ilin g  smoke toward rear, proper, 
as per record drawing.
The insignia w ill face toward the ffcont 
of the a ircra ft.
HISTORY: The 22d Bombardment Squadron, Bedim ,
was originally  organized as the 22d 
Bombardment Squadron, <23, AF, which 
was constituted and made active a t  
Hamilton F ield , C alifornia, on
20 October 1939, pursuant to  author­
ity  contained in  AG 320.2 (9-28-39), 
dated 20 October 1939; inactivated on 
6 April 1942 per Radiogram, dated
6 April 1942; authorized to  be a c ti­
vated a t Columbia, South Carolina, 
per AG 320.2 (4-16-42) KH-H-AF, dated
21 April 1942, activated 4 Hay 1942; 
reorganized as the 22d Bombardment 
Squadron (ttadiua), in  accordance
129
SubJ i A ircraft Marking for the 22d Bombardment Squadron (lfl (Cont5d .)
1 I n d . 
Drawing.
.HISTORY: vdth f /0  1-127, dated 1 Ju2y 1942, 08
(Cont'd.) 15 Septeabar 1942; reorganised as tb s
22d Bombardment Squadron, Medium, in  
accordance with T/0 1-127, dated 
18 August 1944.
The 23d Bombardment Squadron) Medina, 
has no other h istory , and i t s  b a ttle  
honors have not been dotarsined.
For the ComrandiEg General, Arsgr Air Forces I
ROBERT Co JOSES,
Colonel, A ir Corps,
Chief, Personnel Services B iv isiea , 
O ffice, A sst. Chief of Air S ta ff, 
Personnel.
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3 i;lst bomb Gp 137
H. ^xSTUCUISKPJJ CHIT CITATIONS
For action over French Jhdo-China, WD GO 92, 191$
11 iocenher 19Ut*»12 March 19lt5
C I T A T I O N
The 3Iilst Bombardment Group (H) i s  c ited  £or outstanding perfom aoa o f  
doty in  cation against the eneBy. Bofcwesn 11 Xteeeabor l$uli end 12 Haareh 
2$h$, th is  croup waged an extremely successful and highly dangeroos 
bridge-busting campaign along the land corridor then held by the Japanese 
between north China and the tremendous raw m aterial poten tial found ia  
her conquests in  southern Asia end adjacent islands* To thwart the  
Japanese plan to  ca p ita lise  on th is  land lin e; the group was aasi#j8d tho 
hazardous task o f destroying the numerous s te e l and concrete bridges on 
the modern r a il  l in e s  in  French Jhdo-Chlna* Two primtey consideration* 
faced the group in  preparing i t s  method of executing th is  mission* 
Supplies, gasoline, and bombs wore a t a  premium in  air-supplied China, and 
the Japanese bed ringed the bridges with extensive an tia ircraft defenses* 
To meet these considerations, the group developed and employed i t s  n o  
sty le  of attack, ng lip  bombing,n which employed & tr ip le  ehangjB in  
bombing lev e l a t lo u  altitude as an elu sive maneuver over heavily do* 
fended, channeled approaches to  the targets* This technique yielded such 
accuracy that the tonnage o f boohs expended per bridge destroyed reached 
a new record low of 7*75 tons per bridge. Despite hazardous conditions 
of low v is ib il ity , rugged terrain , and intense, accurate ant i air cra ft 
f ir e , unler which a large part o f these "glip hording" missions were run, 
the group cectr-ved 21 major bridges end damaged 17 in  23 m issions. 
Particularly representative o f tho determination and perseverance o f the 
combat crews are the missions of 27 February and *> Marsh 19k$» A to ta l 
of 10 h igh-priority bridges were destroyed end 2 damaged under ensqy 
f ir e , with the expenditure of 385 bomb tons per bridge* Because the 
bridges wore generally located in gorges and va lleys, approach to  tbs 
targets was restr icted  to narrow lanes in  which the enaqr could e a s ily  
concentrate th e ir  defensive fire*  Four of the group's Airplanes were 
shot down in  these attacks and 31 others were damaged. Twenty craw 
Belabors wore k illsd  and twelve were wounded* The coat was not lig h t  to  
the group, but the interdiction  o f th is overland route was iaparativo. 
With extraordinary heroism, gallantry, determination, and esp rit da 
corps, the group so t  only met the dangerous challenge, but established  
a  new record in  econosy of operations in  doing so* These aehievesuaxte o f  
the iMg*. ^nhgroEent Croup (H) are worthy o f the gallant tradition* o f  
tho American m ilitary service*
See Bibliographical Koue*
APPENDIX J 
INSIGNIAS OF THE FOURTEENTH AIR FORCE 
AND THE FLYING TIGERS
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14 TH AIR F O R C E
j
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HISTORY CF INSIGNIA. CF FOQRTEEOTH AIR FORCE
The Fourteenth Air Force was constituted 5 March 1943 and mada 
active 10 March 1943J i t  is  en titled  to  b attle  participation cred its 
as follow s:
China Defensive and China O ffensive, GO 12, WD, 1 Feb 46
The Fourteenth' Air Force insign ia was approved 6 August 1943, as 
a resu lt of a personal request for such approval and adaption from 
General Chennault. The basis for the design submitted l ie s  in  the 
organization of the Fourteenth Air Force from the A.T.G., commonly 
known as the •’Flying Tigers".
The A.V.G. (Flying Tigers) was not a regularly organized u n it of 
the Army of the United States, therefore no o ff ic ia l connection could 
e x is t  between th is  group and the Fourteenth Air Farce. However, upon 
the organization of the Fourteenth Air Force, individual members of 
the group were eith er called to  active duty under reserve commissions 
or commissioned in  the Army of the United States and assigned to  duty 
with the 23d Fighter Group, a un it of the Fourteenth Air Farce. Other 
individual members of the A.V.G. were undoubtedly assigned to  other 
units of that force (General Chennault).
D escription o f In sign ia :
On a blue disc 2-1/2 inches in diameter, a winged Bengal 
tig er  golden orange with black and white markings, below and p a rtia lly  
covering a white star 7/3 inches in  diameter, charged with a 5/16 inch 
red d isc.
S ig n ifican ce  of In s ig n ia :
The design of th is insignia is  adapted from the insignia  
used by the A.V.G. (Flying Tigers) members of which now fora a part 
of the Fourteenth Air Force.
USAF UNIT LINEAGE
C o n stitu ted  F o u rteen th  A ir Force on 5 Mar 191:3.
WD L tr  AG 320.2 (3-2-1*3) GR-I-AFDPU-K, 5 Mar 151:3.
A ctivated  on 10 Mar 191:3.
GO 10, He US Army Forces CUT, 10 Mar 1:3; GC 1, llu'iF, 1C Mar 1:3; AG Card and 
AFHc Form 6-525, l h t h  AF.
In a c tiv a te d  on 6 Jan  191:6.
WD L tr  322 (3 0  Nov U5) 05-I-SFH 0U -” ,  5 Dec U5 amnd by AC- 322 (8  J u l  U6) 
A0-T-AFC0P. (Ili7e)-M , I I  Ju l U6; L tr , ASF, SSPE, 8 Jan 1:6; GO 1 , ASF, SEFE,
2 Jan 1:6.
 ̂
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APPENDIX K
FOREWORD FROM THE HISTORY OF THE 22ND BOMB SQUADRON,
THE FLYING TIGERS
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F o r e w o r d
T here w ill be a day when our combat stories will have 
lost their zest; when our wild tales of heroism will have 
been unrecognizably mangled even beyond their origi­
nal half-truths; when our wife will be bored by the 
millionth re-telling; when our friends w ill have 
shamed us by fibbing more dramatically than we. In 
short, there will be a day when we will be left alone- 
by the fireplace with our memories, our pipe and our 
dog. Toward that day this book is dedicated.
—
— — 1
Approved by m
Commanding General 
14th Air Force 
Kunming, China 
May 1945
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